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‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’: Research into the commissioning of 
homelessness services in the last 10 years
This report therefore comes at an important 
moment, and sets out starkly what has happened 
over the last ten years. Austerity has left everyone, 
from councils to charities and voluntary sector 
providers, trying to do more with less. The result is 
clear to see on our streets.
In Greater Manchester, we seek to commission for 
people, place and prevention. This involves working 
beyond traditional silos and taking a person-
centred approach. And through schemes like our  
A Bed Every Night programme (which provides a 
bed for anyone who is sleeping rough or at 
imminent risk of sleeping rough in Greater 
Manchester – whatever the weather), Housing First, 
and the tireless work of local authorities, charities 
and thousands of individuals across our city-region, 
we are slowly turning the tide. 
This report is a welcome ‘deep dive’ into how 
commissioning has changed over the last ten years 
(for good and ill). By bringing the ‘voice’ of 
commissioners together with others from across 
the system, it provides a valuable perspective on 
how local authorities have tried to mitigate the 
impact of cuts while supporting their residents.  
I particularly welcome the report’s focus on the 
negative impact of unstable, short-term funding 
pots and the need for more certainty, longevity and 
local control of funding to tackle homelessness and 
rough sleeping.
In Greater Manchester, we remain committed to 
ending the need for people to sleep rough and to 
do everything we can to tackle homelessness. This 
report is an important contribution to the debate 
about how we make that happen. 
Andy Burnham
Mayor of Greater Manchester
Rising homelessness is one of the biggest moral challenges  
we face in our society and here in Greater Manchester,  
we are leading the debate about how best to prevent it. 
FOREWORD by Andy Burnham
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‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’: Research into the commissioning of 
homelessness services in the last 10 years
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Introduction to this study
The Riverside Group Limited funded this study, 
conducted by Imogen Blood & Associates and 
Nicholas Pleace (University of York), to explore  
the following questions: 
 What are the most significant trends 
or changes in the commissioning of 
homelessness services in recent years? 
 What lessons can be learned from these 
changes to inform future policy and 
strategy?
 
We used an approach called Most Significant 
Change, collecting 19 ‘stories’ summarising key 
changes in commissioning from interviews with  
17 local authority commissioners, then bringing 
together diverse stakeholders in three panel 
meetings to discuss the stories and reflect on the 
learning from them. 
The panels included representatives from MHCLG, 
Crisis, Homeless Link, the National Housing 
Federation, the Local Government Association, the 
Housing Associations Charitable Trust, Greater 
Manchester and Liverpool City Region Combined 
Regional Authorities and Shelter, as well as people 
with lived, frontline and management experience 
of homelessness services. We also conducted focus 
groups with a range of supported housing providers 
in partnership with Homeless Link and the National 
Housing Federation. 
Changes to the national policy context  
over the last decade
The financing of revenue costs for housing related 
support has become ever more inconsistent and 
uncertain, with dedicated budgets ceasing to exist 
and very deep expenditure cuts occurring from 
2008 onwards. These cuts have taken place within 
a context of wider funding reductions and other 
changes to mental health, addiction, social care, 
criminal justice and health services, and alongside 
rising need for social and affordable housing 
outstripping supply and the introduction of  
welfare reform. 
The last decade has seen increased demand for 
homelessness services, including from increasing 
numbers of people with high and complex needs, 
alongside spikes in rough sleeping. 
The past decade has also seen the implementation 
of legislation such as the Homelessness Reduction 
Act 2017 and the Care Act 2014, which have the 
potential to transform local authorities’ response  
to those experiencing or at risk of homelessness, 
including those with high care and support needs. 
However, it is not yet clear that this potential is 
being consistently realised. 
Our findings suggest huge variations in the way in 
which local authorities have responded to these 
challenges and opportunities. 
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The ‘traumatised system’
In order to preserve service delivery in this context, 
local authorities have typically: 
— Cut the value and length of commissioned 
contracts for homelessness services; 
— Reduced their in-house commissioning 
capacity; 
— Extended or rolled-up contracts to reduce the 
amount of administration; 
— Performance managed services, often using 
ambitious targets for ‘throughput’; 
— Established ‘homelessness pathways’ in order 
to integrate and better manage access to 
services;  
— Commissioned jointly across local authorities. 
Some local authorities have: 
— Cut back on tenancy sustainment/floating 
support; 
— Created short-stay assessment centres in 
response to increased rough sleeping; 
— Commissioned more dispersed provision 
(services using ordinary, scattered housing); 
— Increased their dependence on non-
commissioned ‘exempt’ supported housing. 
We found evidence of innovation, collaboration  
and more effective and humanitarian practice in 
reducing homelessness. However, some of the 
adaptations and changes that have occurred in 
commissioning, planning and delivery of 
homelessness services must now be recognised as 
maladaptive, inefficient and counter-productive. 
We heard many examples of ‘efficiency leading to 
inefficiency’ (cuts in one area causing increased 
costs and/or operational problems in others), of 
‘goldfish effect policy’ (in which services are 
de-commissioned then re-commissioned), and of 
complex inter-relationships between different 
policies. This builds a picture of a homelessness 
system which is ‘traumatised’, or shocked and upset 
by the direct and indirect effects of funding cuts 
and national policy changes.  We found evidence of 
contradictory behaviours and a sense of agencies 
unwillingly having to pursue policies that were 
known to generate adverse effects resulting from 
trauma at all levels of the system. 
We also heard huge insight and wisdom drawn 
from practice and lived experience during this 
study. Much is known about what works and what 
is needed to end homelessness. If the system can 
be ‘de-traumatised’ so that imagination and 
innovation are enabled and sustained, it should be 
possible for things to get a lot better, very quickly. 
Key findings and recommendations
To create a fully-functioning system to prevent and 
end homelessness, an integrated strategy for 
housing and support, under-pinned by stable 
funding, is needed at both national and local levels. 
The following table presents our key findings, with 
corresponding high-level recommendations. 
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Stable funding for housing-related support
Finding RECOMMENDATION
Sustained cuts to local authority and health funding have 
impacted on the amount and quality of housing-related 
support/ supported housing available to those experiencing  
or at risk of homelessness. 
Proper investment in support, alongside 
access to affordable housing, is needed in 
order to prevent and end homelessness.
Uncertainty about future budget allocations from central 
government make it hard for local authorities to plan. This 
results in short-term contracts which reduce value for money 
as providers also cannot plan with confidence, i.e. attract and 
retain good staff and invest in services. 
Funding levels need to be predictable and 
facilitated by longer term contracts in 
order to help local authorities and service 
providers plan
Short-term, prescriptive and competitively-accessed funding 
for rough sleeper initiatives ties up commissioner time  
and does not always align with wider local strategies.  
Short term funding involves setting up, operating and then 
de-commissioning projects, i.e. project ‘sunsets’ continually 
occur because funding is short term. This is a resource-
intensive process and can be damaging to relationships  
and outcomes for individuals. 
Funding streams need to be provided with 
local control and flexibility, balanced with 
accountability.
There is evidence of attempts at efficiency leading to 
inefficiencies, for example with services being set up and 
ended, only to be resurrected because they were necessary  
to begin with (in what we labelled ‘goldfish effect policy’).  
In other cases, cuts to one area of services have caused rises  
in spending and/or logistical challenges in others. 
More comprehensive/strategic impact 
assessment of proposed policies is needed 
both nationally and locally to ensure a 
longer-term view of ‘value for money’.
 
A quality framework for the supported housing sector
Finding RECOMMENDATION
Most commissioning still tends to be managerially driven, 
focusing on throughput, processes and value for money rather 
than on relationships and outcomes for individuals and 
communities. 
While local authorities have made some progress in this area; 
the consistent provision of relationship-based, trauma-
informed and person-centred approaches has to be supported 
by practical changes to tender processes, contract length and 
value, and performance management. It is not sufficient for 
strategies and specifications to simply state that this should  
be the ethos. 
The supported housing sector needs a 
framework of standards to inform a 
consistent understanding of ‘quality’.
This should align with the Housing First 
principles in order to focus the system on 
choice, control, rights and relationships.
The lack of consistent regulation across the sector makes it 
difficult for local authorities and quality providers to plan 
strategically and can leave people using services vulnerable  
to poor quality provision. 
There needs to be greater understanding 
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Local, integrated homelessness strategies, which bring together strategies for homelessness prevention 
and rough sleeping, the commissioning of housing-related support, affordable housing supply and private 
rented sector access and enforcement.
Finding RECOMMENDATION
Competitive tendering focused largely on lowest price does not 
seem to be the best mechanism for promoting quality or cost 
effectiveness in this sector. There is evidence this can lead to 
cuts in staff pay and terms and conditions, and reductions to 
the scope and coverage of services in order to compete.  
Interestingly, many commissioners are encouraging alliances 
and dialogue as a way of better managing the provider 
‘market’. 
There is an emerging recognition in some authorities that 
providers and people with lived experience of services need to 
be part of developing effective local solutions as they often 
have experience of the whole system.  
Strategies should be developed through 
engagement with supported housing 
providers, people with lived experience 
and the wider voluntary and community 
sector. 
A wider range of evaluation criteria should 
be used to assess tenders, particularly 
including user-led views of what makes for 
an effective service.  
In the current funding environment, focusing resources on 
crisis services for people with higher levels of need leaves gaps 
in both ‘upstream’ prevention and ‘downstream’ resettlement 
services. This makes it more likely for people to become 
homeless and harder for them to exit homelessness. 
Medium-level support services often do not work well for those 
with high and complex needs, who then either avoid services, 
abandon, get evicted or over-stay. 
Local authorities need to be clear about 
the role of different housing support 
projects and models within the system 
and how they function together as a 
whole system. There should be investment 
in floating support services that can both 
prevent homelessness and support and 
sustain resettlement, as well as models 
that work effectively with people with 
complex needs.  
A whole system approach
Finding RECOMMENDATION
Commissioning tends to happen in agency/policy ‘silos’,  
yet homelessness is a complex problem which can only be 
tackled effectively through whole system strategic planning. 
For example, it is not possible to sustainably tackle rough 
sleeping without aligned strategies to provide affordable 
housing and mental health services. 
Strategic buy-in from health and criminal 
justice agencies and the DWP is essential 
if there is to be effective coordination of 
services for individuals and a wider and 
longer-term view of ‘cost effectiveness’.
Creating the right conditions for innovation
Finding RECOMMENDATION
Innovation is difficult in the current context, with 
commissioners and providers often tied up ‘fire-fighting’  
in the face of increased demand and fewer resources. 
Innovation happens where there is a strategic approach  
to making systems deliver what individuals need.  
The sector needs to identify, understand 
and nurture promising practice. 
Policies, commissioning strategies, 
performance frameworks and funding 
streams should be designed so as to 
support the conditions to prompt and 
sustain innovation.  
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1. Our approach: Stories of change
The Riverside Group’s decision to fund this 
independent national study gave us the 
opportunity to take a snapshot of local 
authority commissioning practice. We were 
asked to consider two research questions: 
 What are the most significant trends 
or changes in the commissioning of 
homelessness services in recent years? 
 What lessons can be learned from these 
changes to inform future policy and 
strategy?
 
Any study of commissioning risks becoming 
somewhat technical and dry. We were keen to bring 
this topic alive, since we believe it is of huge 
importance to those involved with homelessness 
services. It is also relevant to those with a wider 
interest in public policy, since it explores the 
relationship between central and local government; 
and the role of the public sector as the 
commissioner of a provider ‘market’. Ultimately,  
it is concerned with what is needed within these 
systems if we are to end and prevent future 
homelessness. 
We decided to use a method called ‘Most 
Significant Change’ (MSC), which has three  
steps: story collection, story selection panels and 
feedback of learning. More detail about our 
approach can be found in the Appendix. 
1.1. Story collection
We built a list of local authority commissioner 
contacts, drawn both from Riverside’s and the 
researchers’ contacts, and conducted interviews 
with a sample of 17 between April and June 2019.  
We spoke to 10 commissioners from the North of 
England, four from the South East (including two 
London Boroughs), two from the East and one  
from the West of England. Our sample included  
10 unitary authorities, five county councils and  
two combined regional authorities. 
This involved the collection of commissioners’ 
stories of significant change, using a simple, 
consistent and non-leading structure. 
Commissioners were asked:  
‘In your opinion, what good and bad changes 
have occurred over the last ten years in 
commissioning homelessness services, as a 
result of changing government policy?’  
We asked them to identify which of these changes 
they felt to be most significant and then asked 
them to describe:
— what it was like before;
— what it is like now; and
— what specifically happened to  
cause the change. 
The interviewer drafted this as a short story, shared 
it with the interviewee for comments and to obtain 
consent to use the stories, anonymously.
We asked them to identify which of these changes 
they felt to be most significant and then asked 
them to describe what it was like before, what it is 
like now, and what specifically happened to cause 
the change. The interviewer drafted this as a short 
story, shared it with the interviewee for comments 






Phases of ‘story selection’
Providers, commissioners & people with  
lived experience involved in highlighting  
the ‘most significant change’
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1.2. Story-selection panels
We convened and facilitated three ‘panels’, in 
which a group was asked to read a number of  
the stories and come together to discuss them. 
Participants shared what struck them most about 
each of the stories, then agreed as a group which 
stories they thought were most significant and why. 
They collectively explained the rationale for the 
decision-making and the key lessons learned from 
their selection process. 
Two first round panels, each with six members, met 
during August 2019 to review the initial collection 
of stories. These contained people from strategic, 
operational management, and frontline roles, 
people with lived experience, and representatives 
from the National Housing Federation and Shelter. 
These first round panels selected six stories from 
the initial collection of 19 to go through to the final 
panel, held in November 2019. 
The final panel included senior officers from 
MHCLG, Local Government Association, Homeless 
Link, Crisis, HACT, Liverpool City CRA and a peer 
researcher with lived experience. This group added 
their own reflections on the selected stories, then 
collectively agreed the lessons learned and how 
these might affect future policy and strategy.  
Andy Burnham, Mayor of Greater Manchester, was 
keen to participate but unable to attend the panel, 
so a separate discussion about the panel report 
was held with him and two officers from the 
Greater Manchester Combined Regional Authority 
in Manchester. 
A full list of final panel participants is  
included in the Appendix. 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
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1.3. Feedback of stories selected, the 
rationale and lessons learned 
A short report summarising the selected stories, the 
rationale for their selection and the overarching 
themes from the discussion was produced by the 
research team and circulated within a fortnight of 
each panel meeting. 
MSC (Better Evaluation, 2020) provides a 
theoretical framework through which change in 
complex and uncertain systems can be explored, 
explained and assessed from a number of different 
perspectives. The panel process effectively 
democratises the analysis process, asking a range 
of people beyond the research team to respond to 
the data. It has also enabled a national 
conversation including a wide range of stakeholders 
which we hope will influence change directly. 
We have undertaken a number of other activities 
alongside the MSC process: 
— At the start of the study, Nicholas Pleace 
produced a brief evidence review of 
Homelessness Service Commissioning, which 
has formed the basis of the second chapter: 
National Policy Context. 
— Two focus group discussions were held, 
including 20 senior representatives of provider 
organisations and their sector bodies, hosted 
by Homeless Link and the National Housing 
Federation. These groups reflected on the 
emerging themes from the commissioner 
interviews and collected the most significant 
changes from providers’ perspectives. 
— The research team analysed the transcripts 
from these focus groups and the 17 
commissioner interviews thematically. 
Commissioners’ responses to the open 
question about good or bad changes to 
commissioning homelessness services as a 
result of government policy were also coded 
and counted. 
We believe this rich and multi-layered collection of 
data provides a unique insight into the operating 
environment for local authority commissioners and 
how this impacts both on the provider market and, 
crucially on those using services. It has also allowed 
us to draw on a range of expertise and experience 
to develop our conclusions regarding future policy 
and strategy. 
1. OUR APPROACH
Chapter 2.  
National policy context
Fig 1: Report structure
Chapter 7. 
What is needed to de-traumatise the system?
Chapter 3.  
Doing more  
with less
Chapter 4.  
Variation in the type of support available
Chapter 5.  
Focus: ‘Bitty short-term funding’
Chapter 6.  
Establishing and sustaining innovations
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1.4. The structure of this report
The idea of the ‘traumatised system’ was 
introduced by one of our national panel members 
and resonated with other panel members, the 
researchers, staff at Riverside and others working  
in the sector with whom we have tested the idea. 
We think it is particularly powerful because it  
allows providers, commissioners, people with lived 
experience, partner agencies and civil servants to 
transcend positions of blame, mistrust and 
othering. We hope that it opens the way for an 
honest conversation about the system, and 
how unintended and counterproductive 
behaviours occur when organisations and 
individuals enter what the panel member 
described as ‘survival mode’.  
 
In chapter 2, we summarise the most relevant 
aspects of the national policy context shaping the 
commissioning of homelessness services over the 
past decade. In particular, we describe the 
combined impact of local authority cuts and the 
removal of the ring-fence around national funding 
for housing-related support. It is this which has 
thrown the sector into ‘survival’ mode. 
In chapter 3, we describe how local authorities have 
responded to the need to ‘Do more with less’ 
funding, in response to rising levels of 
homelessness, including increasing numbers of 
people with complex needs. Although we found 
huge variation in local authorities’ responses, we 
identify, evidence and reflect on a number of trends 
in relation to how services are commissioned.  
In chapter 4, we consider some of the changing 
trends in relation to the types of services that are 
commissioned, and the role of non-commissioned 




In chapter 5, we present and reflect on one of  
the stories which resonated most with panel 
participants – which considers the impact of ‘bitty 
short-term funding’ focused on rough sleepers as a 
result of the government’s Rough Sleeping 
Initiative. 
In chapter 6, we consider ‘innovation’ in this 
challenging context – what it means, what gets in 
the way of it, and what enables and sustains it. We 
share three stories selected by our panels which 
show examples of different types of innovation and 
highlight some of the risks these initiatives face 
within the current context. 
Finally, in chapter 7, we draw together our thinking 
about the ‘traumatised system’ and what needs to 
happen moving forwards to de-traumatise it. We 
propose the core components of a fully-functioning 
system, based on the findings from this study. 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
Fig 2: National policy context affecting commissioning in homelessness
Supported Housing  
Commissioning






LocalismChanges to funding  
programmes
Wider cuts to the  
public sector
Care Act 2014
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2.1. Changes to the funding of  
housing-related support
The financing of revenue costs for housing-related 
support has become ever more inconsistent and 
uncertain, with dedicated budgets ceasing to exist 
and very deep expenditure cuts occurring from 
2008 onwards. The key changes of the last 20 
years have been the shift from the use of the 
national benefits system (Housing Benefit service 
charge element) to pay for supported housing, to a 
ring-fenced and capped ‘Supporting People’ central 
government grant being paid to local authorities, 
followed by a non-ringfenced grant integrated into 
general local authority funding in the context of 
deep cuts. 
Use of Housing Benefit service charge element 
(up to 2003)
The Housing Benefit service charge element was 
effectively open-ended: if total provision of housing 
related support increased, eligible residents or 
tenants in eligible services would receive funding.  
However, costs were found to be spiralling upwards 
and eligibility of supported housing services for  
the service charge element was also being 
inconsistently interpreted. Inconsistences and 
spiking costs led to demands for reform (Oldman  
et al., 1996), the immediate result of which was  
the Supporting People programme. 
‘Supporting People’ grant to local authorities 
(2003 to 2009)
Supporting People created dedicated, ring-fenced1  
funds for each local authority, derived from levels of 
spending on ‘general counselling and support’ 
within the Housing Benefit service charge element2. 
Budget levels were capped, creating controls on 
how much could be spent on housing related 
support by local authority commissioners. 
2. Changes to the national policy context  
over the last decade
1 The funding could only be spent on housing-related support.
2 This was initially calculated as a ‘transitional Housing Benefit’ payment, which then  
  formed the basis on which the subsequent Supporting People grant was calculated.  
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Removal of the ring-fence  
(2010 onwards)
Expenditure on Supporting People was higher than 
had been anticipated, approaching £2 billion 
annually, and this brought pressure to further 
reduce spending levels. Proposals were put in place 
to reduce the grant paid to local authorities, cutting 
commissioning budgets for housing related support 
services. This was then followed by a decision to 
remove ring-fencing from the Supporting People 
grant. Research in pilot local authorities, where 
removal of the ring-fence meant that Supporting 
People grant had become a nominal budget, i.e. it 
was part of general funding and no longer had to 
be spent on housing related support, indicated that 
removing ringfencing would threaten the scale, 
scope and consistency of housing related support 
(Pleace, 2008); nevertheless, the process went 
ahead.  
Processes to contain and reduce expenditure on 
housing related support were well in train long 
before the point at which ‘austerity’ policies began 
to bite from 2010 onwards. In 2003, at the launch 
of Supporting People, the ring-fenced grant to local 
authorities had been at £1.8 billion, in the 2010 
Spending Review funding levels were cut from 
£1.64 billion in 2010/11 to £1.59 billion in 
2014/153. However, the nominal reduction in 
Supporting People funding was far less important 
than the cuts to general grants to local authorities, 
of which the non-ringfenced Supporting People 
grant was now part. As there was no longer any 
protected budget for housing support, when 
general cuts happened, housing support services 
were also likely to be cut. 
The Local Government Association has estimated 
that on current trends, central government funding 
to local authorities will have fallen by 77% over the 
course of 2010-2020. In 2015/16, councils in 
England received £9.9 billion in Revenue Support 
Grant (RSG) and in 2019/20 this is predicted to fall 
to £2.2 billion (LGA, 2018; Hastings et al., 2015).
Impact on the homelessness sector
The cumulative effect on the homelessness sector 
has been marked. In 2018, Homeless Link reported 
an estimate of 34,497 bed spaces4 in supported 
housing projects for homeless people in England, 
there having been in excess of 50,000 beds eight 
years earlier5. Figures for floating support services 
are harder to assemble on a reliable basis. Many 
areas have some form of provision, including 
tenancy sustainment services and in some areas 
Housing First services, but these services are 
probably supporting fewer people than 
accommodation-based services. There have been 
reports of individual local authorities removing 
entire systems of homelessness service provision in 
response to funding cuts. 
Tracking the exact scale of these cuts has been 
difficult as, while some data are still collected, one 
of the elements that experienced a heavy loss of 
funding was the Supporting People monitoring 
systems for England, which had been collected and 
analysed by the University of St Andrews for several 
years (Department for Communities and Local 
Government, University of St Andrews, Centre for 
Housing Research, 2012). 
Recent analysis undertaken by WPI Economics for 
St Mungo’s and Homeless Link (Thunder and Rose, 
2019) suggests that in 2017/18, nearly £1 billion 
less was spent on single homelessness than was 
spent in 2008/9 – a fall of more than 50%, which is 
entirely accounted for by reduced spending on 
former Supporting People activity. 
In summary, while the last 10 years of local 
authority funding cuts has had distinct and 
wide-ranging effects on commissioning of 
homelessness services, there are several reasons 
why spending fell, all of which result from long-term 
efforts by a succession of governments to reduce 
spending on housing-related support services. 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
3 Source: DCLG.
4 Note that many of these ‘bedspaces’ are in fact self-contained rooms and/or studio apartments.
5 Source: Homeless Link. 
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2.2. Initiatives to tackle rough sleeping
Following an increase of 169% in the number of 
people officially counted as sleeping rough from 
2010 to 2017 (Homeless Link, 2017), the 
government published its Rough Sleeping Strategy, 
in August 2018. This set out £100 million of 
funding to tackle rough sleeping, through a number 
of different funding initiatives, as part of its 
commitment to halve rough sleeping by 2022 and 
end it by 2027 (Ministry of Housing, Communities 
and Local Government, 2018). 
This funding included the Rough Sleeping Initiative 
Fund, targeted at 83 local authorities with the 
highest numbers of people sleeping rough, based 
on the 2017 rough sleeping snapshot. Local 
authorities have also been able to bid for the Rapid 
Rehousing Pathway (RRP) Fund to provide 
Somewhere Safe to Stay hubs, Supported Lettings, 
Navigators and/or Local Lettings Agencies. 
This is not the first concerted focus from central 
government to reduce numbers of rough sleepers 
– the Rough Sleepers’ Unit (RSU) operated under 
Louise Casey’s leadership, between 1999 and 2001. 
However, the current Rough Sleeper funding 
strategy is being implemented within a very 
different fiscal climate. Back in 2000, the funding 
of supported housing was not – as we have seen – 
subject to the same financial limits, while 
significant additional funding was targeted on 
building additional, innovative services for people 
sleeping rough (Lomax and Netto, 2007). This 
almost certainly contributed to the success of the 
RSU in meeting its targets. 
A decade after the removal of the Supporting 
People ring-fence, ‘bitty short-term funding’ (to use 
the words of one of our local authority storytellers) 
focused on rough sleepers is having a mixed 
impact. Whilst the additional funding was 
welcomed by our participants, it replaces only a 
small proportion of local authority spending that 
has been lost in recent years (Thunder and Rose, 
2019) and comes with stipulations as to what it can 
be spent on.
2.3. Cuts and changes to the wider 
public sector
The commissioning of homelessness and other 
services does not happen in a vacuum, with the 
policy changes and expenditure levels for other 
services having important impacts on 
homelessness services. These include:
— Cuts to mental health services
— Cuts to addiction services
— Welfare reform: benefit caps, sanctions and 
limits on local housing allowance/housing 
element within Universal Credit (which may 
trigger homelessness or make sustaining 
an exit from homelessness more difficult) 
(Barker, 2018)
— Long-term impacts of sustained reductions in 
social housing supply
— Relative cuts to NHS services, and a number 
of re-organisations, most noticeably the 
shift from Primary Care Trusts to Clinical 
Commissioning Groups in 2013 
— Cuts to social care services  
— Cuts to criminal justice services (e.g. 
specialist officers trained to work with 
vulnerable people and funding for supported 
accommodation projects for offenders), 
within the re-structuring of the probation 
service under the Transforming Rehabilitation 
programme.
Previous research has suggested that cuts to other 
services can drag down the performance of a range 
of homelessness services and create high costs for 
the public purse (Pleace and Culhane, 2016). 
Homeless people can become effectively ‘stuck’ in 
what are supposed to be temporary supported 
housing services or nightshelters, not through their 
own actions or those of the service, but because the 
right mix of housing and correct array of support 
from multiple agencies, has become very 
challenging to assemble. 
2. CHANGES TO THE NATIONAL POLICY CONTEXT OVER THE LAST DECADE
Imogen Blood & Associates / University of York (Centre for Housing Policy)  13
One concern is that the effects of sustained 
expenditure cuts seen in other sectors, such as 
social care, are also impacting housing related 
support in similar ways: in effect, services have 
become sufficiently scarce to mean that only 
people with the highest level of need can 
access them. (Lynch et al., 2016).
2.4. Localism and devolution
The Localism Act 2011 was intended to give local 
authorities the formal legal ability and general 
confidence to ‘get on with the job’ (Department for 
Communities and Local Government, 2011). 
Specifically in relation to housing, councils were 
given more scope to determine social housing 
allocation policies at a local level and the capacity 
to discharge their homelessness duties in the 
private rented sector. 
The introduction of legislation in 2009 to permit 
the establishment of combined authorities has 
meant that that two or more neighbouring councils 
can decide to coordinate their responsibilities and 
powers over services, including aspects of housing 
and social care. Devolution potentially creates a 
bigger strategic canvas and some pooling of 
resources for commissioning of homelessness 
services. 
Overall, we heard mixed messages about the 
perceived impact of ‘localism’ in this part of the 
sector: many felt that, while a place-based 
response to homelessness is essential, localism had 
‘gone too far’, with huge variations between the 
level of service funded by different authorities. This 
inconsistency was felt to have a number of impacts: 
— Firstly it can create a postcode lottery for 
those affected by homelessness; 
— Secondly there is a risk that, if one area 
invests in good services (and others do not), 
people move to the area with better services, 
though they may then find they are unable to 
access services without a demonstrable ‘local 
connection’; 
— Those trying to promote a coordinated 
approach between authorities, for example 
within combined regional authorities, felt that 
these inconsistencies could get in the way. 
Despite being given the legal power to ‘get on with 
the job’, sustained cuts to local authority funding 
have severely restricted their capacity to do so. 
2.5. Commissioning and value for money
Researchers have highlighted the ways in which the 
relationship between local authorities and the 
housing related support sector has been changed 
by commissioning (Saario et al., 2017)  The 
homelessness sector now often has a ‘client’ 
relationship with local authorities, defined through 
legally binding, often time-limited, contracts on 
which they are often wholly or largely dependent 
for the resources to operate services. The 
homelessness sector can represent its views, 
promote changes in policy and practice, through 
collective action such as the Housing First England 
programme led by Homeless Link, while individual 
service providers can also lobby and discuss ideas 
with individual local authorities, or at national, 
regional or local level.  However, the presence of a 
contractual relationship, according to some 
research, shapes the nature of the interaction of 
local authorities and the homelessness sector, 
which means relationships are inherently uneven 
(Buckingham, 2012).  
The homelessness sector realised early on that 
commissioning of services would be determined in 
part by whether or not those services were seen as 
effective. This effort to demonstrate effectiveness 
(encouraged by Homeless Link, 2013) has centred 
on making the case that investment in the 
homelessness sector will produce dividends for the 
public sector, by reducing total public expenditure 
on homelessness, as homelessness will cost society 
more, financially and in terms of social cohesion, if 
little or nothing is done.  
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The process of evidencing effectiveness as a way to 
sustain public investment in the homelessness 
sector has advanced haphazardly and has 
generated mixed effects. There have, in essence, 
been two problems.  First, some of the systems 
developed to show effectiveness were of limited 
effectiveness and robustness, a good example 
being the Outcomes Star developed by Triangle 
Consulting. While not without utility, the Outcomes 
Star lacked the robustness expected by a public 
sector used to rigorous statistical measures of 
service effectiveness and efficiency developed over 
the course of decades in areas like crime, social care 
and health (Johnson and Pleace, 2016). More 
generally, the homelessness sector, which had not 
previously been required to provide evidence of 
cost-effectiveness for most of its existence, 
arguably still finds it challenging to provide the kind 
of data that would be taken as evidence of 
effectiveness by social care and health 
commissioners.    
Alternative funding arrangements, centred on 
marketisation, which offers a return on investment 
in homelessness services, i.e. Social Investment 
Bonds (SIB) (Cooper et al., 2016) and the 
development of social enterprise and social 
business models have been the subject of 
exploration, piloting and evaluation for some years 
(Teasdale, 2010).  The key issues here appear to 
centre on the inherent limitations of these models, 
which require substantial investments and/or can 
require sustained financial support to be viable. 
Both sets of approaches have been in place for 
some time, SIBs since 2010 and social enterprises 
for rather longer, but while they are aspects of the 
financing of homelessness services, they have yet 
to take on a large-scale role.  This suggests these 
alternative forms of funding may have some 
inherent limits and cannot substitute for the  
loss of grant income from local government 
commissioning. 
2.6. The Homelessness Reduction  
Act 2017
The idea of enhanced cost effectiveness was also  
a driver behind the 2017 Homelessness Reduction 
Act (HRA), which drew on evidence suggesting  
that relatively low-cost preventative services  
could reduce total experience of homelessness 
significantly and, thus, eventually lead to  
much reduced levels of overall expenditure  
on homelessness.
Before the HRA came into effect, only local 
households with children, or others defined as 
‘vulnerable’ and hence in ‘priority need’ and were 
assessed as having become homeless through  
no fault of their own, were entitled to support  
from a local authority in England. Other types of 
household, including most single people and 
childless couples, were entitled to advice and, from 
the mid 2000s onwards, authorities increasingly 
offered preventative and relief (rapid rehousing) 
services, although these were variable in their 
nature and extent. 
The HRA widened the duties of local authorities, 
who are now required to provide certain types of 
advice and support (but not necessarily 
accommodation) to all homeless individuals or 
households. Nevertheless, local authorities still have 
an element of choice in terms of how they respond 
to the prevention duties, especially for ‘non-priority’ 
households, and there is emerging evidence (Crisis, 
2019; House of Commons, 2019) of divergent 
strategies and practice in this regard. A full review 
of the HRA will be conducted in March 2020. 
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2.7. The Care Act 2014
A logical response from the homelessness sector, in 
the face of the sustained cuts to existing funding 
sources, has been to seek and develop alternative 
sources of income. A review in 2015 explored the 
potential for the Care Act to enable homeless 
individuals and homelessness services to access 
local authority funds for social care and support, 
including personal budgets. The report noted that 
the Care Act removed some of the definitions as to 
which ‘client groups’ social services had 
responsibility for, instead emphasising the 
importance of individual care and support needs to 
assessment. Although this theoretically created 
greater scope to spend on homelessness services, 
the report was also rightly hesitant about the 
degree to which this new funding source had 
actually become available to the homelessness 
sector (Cornes et al., 2015).   
While there have been examples of use of personal 
budgets and cross and direct financing of 
homelessness services, these appear to be unusual, 
although this is in the context where proper 
mapping of activity has not been attempted.  
There may be several reasons for this.
The history of social care over the last 30 years has 
been one of shifting resources towards the highest 
need individuals, in a context of ever-increasing 
fiscal constraint. Supporting People was designed in 
part to pick up the low intensity support which 
social services were moving away from. Within this 
context, seeing adult social care as a possible 
source of funding for homelessness services is 
problematic. Homelessness services, alongside 
other housing-related support funded by 
Supporting People, were intended to help reduce 
pressure on social services spending, not increase it.  
Another challenge is that of numbers: the homeless 
population is tiny in comparison to older people with 
care needs, for whom social services departments 
have statutory responsibilities. Equally, while some 
of those experiencing homelessness have high and 
complex needs, the majority do not – their 
homelessness has social causes such as domestic 
violence, relationship breakdown and poverty. 
2.8. Health 
NHS commissioning around homelessness has seen 
some important breakthroughs, such as the 
development of innovations like the Pathways 
model6 of integrated healthcare for single homeless 
people and rough sleepers, but this has tended to 
involve NHS commissioners working with the NHS 
providers, rather than commissioning services from 
the homelessness sector. 
There are three main issues here: 
1. The NHS commissions treatment and public 
health services, personal care and elements of 
rehabilitation are the responsibility of social 
services departments, while housing related 
support is also outside its direct remit.  
2. While there is potential scope to use public 
health funding to improve the health of 
homeless populations, there is again the 
issue of scale. Although arguments can be 
made about the high cost of some homeless 
people to the NHS, they are not numerous 
relative to other groups. Housing-related 
support may help this cohort to use fewer – or 
more planned and preventative – healthcare 
services; however, this does not produce 
‘cashable’ savings. 
3. Thirdly, the NHS works within the 
conventions of health science; investment 
or commissioning is led by robust clinical 
research, that routinely employs experimental 
(randomised control) trials that are very rarely 
applied to evaluating homelessness services.  
The absence of clinical level evidence on 
homelessness service effectiveness limits the 
scope for attracting health funding.   
In the following chapter, we present the emerging 
themes from this study regarding how local 
authorities have responded to the policy changes 
we have outlined here. 
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As we have seen, the changing funding and 
policy context is compounded by the fact that 
there is increased demand for services, 
including a rise in the number of homeless 
people with complex needs. Local authorities 
and providers really have been tasked with 
‘doing more with less’. We were struck by the 
sheer variation in how local authorities have 
responded to this challenge.  
In this chapter, we present evidence from our study 
of the different ways in which local authorities and 
providers have changed their approach to 
commissioning in order to sustain delivery of 
homelessness services in the economically 
challenging context of the past decade. 
We consider the impacts of ‘doing more with less’ 
on the quality of services and on those using them. 
Some of these trends are more positive or negative 
than others; however, most are likely to have mixed 
impacts, depending how they have been 
implemented and the local variation in the extent 
of resource loss. 
3.1. Cutting the value of contracts
The obvious first step for any council faced with a 
77% cut in funding from central government over 
the past decade (LGA, 2018; Hastings et al., 2015) 
is to reduce the value of their contracts with 
providers. There seems to be a consensus that 
some of the initial rounds of cuts did help to reduce 
inefficiencies, and encourage innovation and 
collaboration; however, a decade on, we are hearing 
how ongoing reductions are reducing the sector’s 
capacity to deliver overall value for money, 
‘traumatising’ the systems for commissioning, 
planning and delivering homelessness services. 
For example, reduced funding for contracts often 
leads to a workforce with poorer pay and 
conditions, even in organisations that have tried to 
prioritise this. A perfect storm can result where 
low-paid and increasingly insecure staff are 
unable to lever in support from over-stretched 
mental health teams and other specialists for 
the rising number of residents with complex needs. 
As one commissioner explained: 
“The skill set of staff is not able to cope, as 
hostels were designed for low level mental health, 
but are dealing with people with paranoid 
schizophrenia who haven’t been assessed”
This is a classic example in which an 
accommodation-based service may find itself 
working with people with higher levels of need than 
it was designed for, or experience budget cuts that 
undermine the service model (Pleace, 2018, p.13).  
In this case, both of these things are happening.  
In this scenario there is a risk of trauma for the 
individual, the staff and other residents, as well as 
risks for provider organisations, councils and the 
local community. 
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We heard various cases of ‘efficiencies leading to 
inefficiency’, for example:
“There is a beautiful ICT suite in one hostel 
funded under what was then DCLG Places for 
Change, but it stands empty, as does the fitted 
kitchen. Staff don’t have the time to support 
people to use it”.
This scenario presents less immediate risk than the 
last one; however, it raises vital questions about the 
purpose of supported housing. Do we want hostels 
to promote an exit from homelessness through 
developing people’s skills and interests or, as 
one commissioner reflected, do we just see them 
as ‘holding grounds’ within the system?  
There is evidence that the costs of maintaining 
homeless people with support needs in hostels and 
other models of temporary supported housing for 
sustained periods - where these services are unable 
to function properly in terms of staff mix and ratios 
and because move-on housing is not available - 
exceeds those of actually rehousing with the right 
mix of floating support (Pleace and Culhane, 2016). 
Further, it has become evident that fixed-site, 
congregate provision is not always the best solution 
for people with high and complex needs, with 
services like Housing First being a more effective 
option, both for the individuals themselves and in 
terms of public expenditure (Pleace and Bretherton, 
2019). Without better investment in staffing, 
supported housing cannot deliver true value for 
money in relation to real outcomes for people –  
and the empty ICT suite serves as a poignant 
symbol of this. 
3.2. Reducing commissioning capacity
Many commissioning teams have themselves taken 
a substantial hit in terms of their size, skills and 
capacity, with some authorities lacking any 
specialist knowledge in supported housing 
commissioning. Provider participants at the 
Homeless Link focus group explained how:  
“Commissioners in many areas, have been 
“centralised” into a generalist commissioning 
team, thereby the experience and expertise from 
the Supporting People teams has been lost”. 
“I think a lot of local authorities have lost any 
kind of team around what they’re going to 
commission, why they’re commissioning what 
they do” (Provider)
In many authorities, the commissioning of housing-
related support is now located within adult social 
care. Since these officers will also be commissioning 
extra care housing and supported housing for 
adults with learning disabilities, there is a clear logic 
to this. However, for the purposes of homelessness 
commissioning, this may increase the risk of further 
cuts, given that social care duties will naturally be 
prioritised by social care commissioners. It also 
means that commissioners of housing-related 
support are likely to sit in a different part of the 
council from their colleagues in Housing and 
Homelessness, even in a unitary authority.
We also heard how, in a number of councils, 
commissioning was being done by a consultant or 
had itself been commissioned out to an external 
organisation. 
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3.3. Performance management
This lack of commissioning ‘infrastructure’ has also 
reduced the capacity of local authorities to actively 
performance manage projects, e.g. by visiting them 
and speaking to staff and residents. We heard that 
there is a substantial recording burden in many 
projects, with staff spending time recording 
‘support hours’ (as they did under Supporting 
People) but feeling that little is ever done with the 
data. Presumably this provides reassurance to 
commissioners that support is happening, yet it 
also reduces the time available to staff to 
provide face-to-face support, in a self-defeating 
cycle which has also been highlighted in the 
care home sector (Warmington et al., 2014). The 
number of hours of support provided also tells little 
about its quality, appropriateness, how it was 
experienced and what difference it made. 
One commissioner reflected on the impact which 
the introduction of New Public Management 
approaches have had on this part of the sector, 
including a shift to setting unrealistic targets for 
services: 
“Back in the late 90s, the approach was, someone 
was a rough sleeper, we had a hostel, we put 
them in it and that’s kind of where it ended... 
Some people would eventually secure more 
permanent accommodation and some people 
would maintain that lifestyle because that was 
what their lifestyle was seen to be... the 
expectations now are very high on the services... 
we ended up having these targets of 75% 
successful outcomes, in a place that was 
supposed to take people who were extremely 
chaotic”.
The introduction of targets in this example was felt 
on the one hand to have brought a positive focus 
within services on supporting people to move on to 
greater independence. However, there are several 
problems with the way in which this has been done. 
Firstly – as seen earlier – monitoring takes up too 
much of workers’ time, which is over-stretched 
anyway, and this time is wasted if the data 
collected is not properly analysed and used. 
Secondly, the targets are set unrealistically high. 
Thirdly, the measures selected do not enable the 
effectiveness of services to be accurately 
monitored, since they focus on throughput. 
‘Successful outcomes’ are generally those in which 
a person moves in a planned way to another service 
or to an independent tenancy within a set 
timescale. This makes sense at some level – 
certainly for a commissioner; however, it is an 
outcome for the system not necessarily for the 
person, who may or may not have made progress in 
other areas of their life. As such, it can only be 
achieved by the project and the person if the rest of 
the system is functioning well and suitable housing 
and ongoing support (if needed) are available at 
the right time and in the right place to support 
move-on. 
This was highlighted by one commissioner  
who explained: 
“You can’t say to a provider, ‘we want you to run 
this 40-bed hostel, and we want you to take in a 
load of drug users that have been on the street, 
and we want you to fix them’.  The reasons that a 
person will get a positive outcome are completely 
variable to the individual and the environment 
they are living in, the position they are headed at, 
and the systems trying to support them, so it is 
not reasonable to hold that provider to account”.
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Providers and panel members also questioned the 
arbitrary timescales that were being imposed on 
services in order to manage increased demand. 
Panel members described this as a ‘commissioner-
driven sausage factory’. Another reflected: 
“It’s good that we’ve stopped people sitting in 
hostels for 18 years, but now we’re down to nine 
months!”
3.4. Shorter contracts which are  
then extended 
In a context of uncertain ongoing funding, few 
local authorities seem confident enough to 
commission, even medium-term support contracts. 
Two-, three- or even one-year contracts seem to 
have become the norm, with built-in provision to 
extend (or break) the contract for additional one- or 
two-year periods, without needing to re-tender. This 
reduces risk and workload for the authority without 
giving providers (and people using services) any 
ongoing security. 
We heard how short-term contracts can have a 
negative impact on the sector’s ability to recruit, 
retain and develop good quality staff. Not only are 
low paid staff trying to support people with higher 
levels of needs than they are equipped to cope 
with, but they are also often doing so under 
constant threat of redundancy. This leads to high 
turnover and burnout across the sector as a whole. 
One panel participant with lived experience 
described receiving four visits from four 
different support workers whilst living in a 
supported housing project, following a mental 
breakdown. Without continuity of staff, there is 
neither opportunity nor motivation to build any sort 
of relationship. 
Short-term contracts are also problematic for 
organisations who own hostel buildings, as well as 
for those delivering support contracts. Without the 
long-term security of revenue, it can be difficult for 
a landlord to decide whether and when to invest in 
renovations or replacements. We also heard 
examples in which short contracts were actually 
blocking commissioners’ own intentions to re-
model buildings or change the type of models 
being used:  
“Despite a desire to commission more dispersed, 
this did not come through in the last 
commissioning round. Part of the problem was 
with the small contract offering – two years – we 
were probably a bit too optimistic about new 
buildings coming forward, as providers need 
insurance for the long-term future; so, we ended 
up with the same as before.”
Many of the commissioners we spoke to – like this 
one – were aware of the negative impact of short 
contracts. Some were starting to buck the trend 
and had been able to or were hoping to offer longer 
contracts: 
“I want to back up words with actions, so I want 
providers to think differently, to invest and get 
workforce right for the future, and you can’t do 
that if you put things out for a 1-2 year basis. 
Lots of contracts we now run are for up to five 
years, which can help build security”
Knowing that they will be delivering a contract for 
the next five years can certainly help support 
providers to offer longer term contracts to their 
staff and landlords to decide whether or not to 
replace the windows. However, if the trade-off for 
this length of contract is an even more cautious 
financial offering from the authority, then the 
benefits are debatable. 
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3.5. Merging contracts
Many local authorities have taken steps to reduce 
the number of contracts they are procuring and 
managing in order to sustain services whilst making 
financial efficiencies. One  described how they had 
been able to commission a new service from the 
overheads saved. Several of the commissioner 
stories tell of a move towards ‘super-providers’, 
partnership contracts and provider alliances. 
This is the most explicit driver of increasing 
oligopoly – or limited competition – within the 
provider market, though we heard of other factors 
influencing this direction of travel. Providers argued 
that some commissioned support contracts are so 
financially tight, they could only be made to stack 
up by a large provider who can benefit from 
economy of scale. Despite this, even large providers 
have pulled out of contracts or out of the market 
altogether so there are clearly limits to what even 
an economy of scale can cope with. Participants 
also highlighted that support contracts which 
effectively require providers to ‘bring your own 
building(s)’ could only be delivered by those 
who already owned the right property or 
properties. 
The main downside of these monopolising 
tendencies is that smaller, local, specialist providers 
are being pushed out of the market, leaving less 
diversity of provision for people experiencing 
homelessness. Larger providers with no local 
connection replace those with decades of local 
knowledge and long-standing relationships with 
homeless people and other services in the area. 
This impacts disproportionately on protected 
characteristic groups – women, people from black 
and minority ethnic groups, and LGBT people. As 
members of the second panel concluded: 
 “There isn’t the variety of services available 
anymore to offer people the service which is 
matched to their needs”. 
However, the rolling up of contracts seemed to 
have been managed more positively by some 
authorities than others. One commissioner 
described how, in implementing a new model in 
which a single provider leads an alliance of 
providers: 
“We had a lot of discussions with providers and 
gave them opportunities to develop alliances 
with each other before the tendering process, so 
there were no surprises”. 
Another described how: 
“Charities are trying to compete with few 
resources, but by supporting them to collaborate 
and build a shared vision, two have recently 
pooled their skills”.  
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This is a good example of the market-shaping role 
which (Sturgess, 2018) has argued is often missing 
in public sector commissioning. Whilst the 
approaches taken by these two authorities towards 
promoting greater dialogue and collaboration feel 
hugely positive, this involves swimming upstream in 
a competitive tendering system operating with 
limited resources. 
Many of the examples in this study cast doubt on 
whether competitive tendering is indeed the right 
mechanism for maximising quality and value for 
money in this sector. We have highlighted some of 
the monopolising tendencies which reduce the 
opportunity for genuine competition in this 
‘marketplace’. It feels significant that at least some 
of these are the result of deliberate commissioner 
strategies to improve value for money. 
Meanwhile, there are a number of ways in which 
competition may actually be counterproductive – 
and these become more pronounced when 
resources are scarce. Unhealthy levels of 
competition between providers can have a 
negative impact on people using services, for 
example, by creating perverse incentives not to 
refer or accept referrals from each other. The need 
to win tenders in order to survive can – as one 
of the national panel members argued – lead  
to ‘mutually convenient layers of lying about 
what can realistically be achieved’. This 
resonates with the reflections of Sturgess (2018): 
“It has become clear that in a significant number 
of public service contracts in the UK in recent 
years, there has not been an honest conversation 
about results and resources, with providers 
committing themselves to undeliverable results 
and uneconomic prices” (p.164)
We were struck by the appetite amongst many of 
our participants, including Riverside, for a more 
‘honest conversation’ across the sector. One 
commissioner explained: 
“We want people to come to us and say ‘no, I 
don’t think commissioning like that is a good idea 
– I think we can do something like this better…
We would like to do it with this partner’. We want 
providers to be more vocal and less subservient, 
we want to try and shift that power dynamic, so 
it’s not all about commissioning, but is genuinely 
more collaborative”. 
3.6. Establishing ‘pathways’ with local 
authority-controlled access
Several of the commissioners we interviewed told 
us about how they had implemented a ‘pathway’ 
model. As one explained:
“Through the Supporting People programme, we 
had developed a range of small, good quality, 
local services which were provided by the 
voluntary and community sector. These just 
existed and were funded and people experiencing 
homelessness could access them directly. 
Following removal of the ring-fence around that 
budget... we carried out a strategic review and 
through this put in place a new Homeless 
Prevention Pathway model and single point of 
access. What we have now is a commissioned 
service that is accountable to us. It gives the 
council ownership and influence over what is 
happening. Anyone can make a referral, but there 
does need to be a formal referral to get someone 
into a pathway service”.
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
22 Imogen Blood & Associates / University of York (Centre for Housing Policy)
A ‘pathway’ approach allows local authorities to 
target their commissioned support, for example, on 
people with a connection to the local area and/or 
those with a certain level of need. Pathways also 
enable tighter monitoring of ‘throughput’ in order 
to ration services. For providers, such pathways 
effectively reduce control over who they 
accommodate and we have heard that this can 
leave them vulnerable to voids if not managed 
efficiently. Reducing the power of provider 
discretion in this way can have a mixed impact  
on people using services. For example, the single 
point of contact may help to remove barriers 
where there have been past evictions; though 
there is also the risk of being banned from the 
whole system rather than from just one service 
within it.   
In the story above, the commissioner told us they 
had de-commissioned the night shelter in order to 
set up the pathway, but that the local community 
sector had later tried to re-create the night shelter 
provision. Research we have conducted with people 
experiencing homelessness for other local 
authorities suggests that local connection policies 
and national policy in relation to those who have 
‘no recourse to public funds’ are key drivers of 
ongoing unmet need outside of local authority 
pathways. 
Panel members expressed concerns that these 
‘pathways’ can feel like ‘systems that we  
have to fit people into not vice versa’. They 
highlighted the risk that, in such systems, 
people with diverse needs are pushed through 
a pathway with arbitrary timescales, and with 
little understanding of the importance of 
choice, motivation and engagement.
3.7. Cross-authority commissioning  
and practice sharing
We heard about and witnessed very different 
attitudes towards sharing practice between local 
authorities. One commissioner felt it was a 
significant change that: 
“Local authorities are looking to each other a bit 
more to share practice and learning. Everyone is 
up against it, so we are all looking for ideas - you 
have to open up and allow people in”. 
However, in the experience of some providers, this 
approach was not felt to be widespread. The 
research team also experienced first-hand some 
authorities who were very keen to protect their 
anonymity within the study. 
We heard examples of joint commissioning 
between neighbouring authorities, both within and 
outside of the combined regional authorities 
(CRAs). The financial pressures facing councils were 
varyingly described as either getting in the way of 
or promoting a joined-up response. One 
commissioner explained: 
“Now all the local authorities are in the same 
boat, so we have to combine forces if we’re going 
to commission anything, and – where there are 
natural boundaries, we are often relaxing the 
local connection requirements”. 
3. DOING MORE WITH LESS
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The combined regional authority structure was 
generally felt to provide a helpful structure for joint 
commissioning, though one CRA participant argued 
that: 
“None of what we are doing here actually 
requires devolution: we are not really using 
devolved powers… it is mostly about building 
consensus, consistency, influencing partners at  
a regional level, etc.”
We heard of huge variations between local 
authorities in the same city region, in terms of their 
histories of homelessness and commissioned 
services. This had led to inconsistencies in referral 
processes and policies between them, which could 
act as a barrier to joint commissioning. One 
participant from a CRA commented: 
“This legacy of localism creates huge challenges 
for regional coordination, even where there is 
reasonable political alignment”. 
3.8. Co-production with people with 
lived experience
One commissioner mentioned a consultation with 
people using services ahead of a major service 
re-design, and another welcomed the increased role 
of people with lived experience as mentors in 
service delivery. Only one commissioner identified 
increased co-production in commissioning itself as 
a significant change, though they also felt this was 
still at quite an early stage of development. This 
commissioner described a range of practical steps 
which had been taken in their authority to ‘make 
co-production the norm’. In addition to more 
traditional ‘consultation’, people with lived 
experience were included in commissioning panels, 
advisory forums and steering groups. Crucially, this 
was supported by an infrastructure of lived 
experience traineeships and posts, and 
organisations specialising in co-production. 
Some panel members were sceptical and felt that 
the term ‘co-production’ had become overused and 
diluted, and often gave little real power to all but 
one or two ‘representatives’. However, one national 
panel member reminded us why it is so important 
to keep pushing to involve people with lived 
experience at a strategic level: 
“Professionals tend only to see and speak about 
their part of the system... People using the 
system have experienced the whole system 
– they have seen it first hand at different stages, 
so they are able to look at it strategically.”
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Having considered some of the changes to the way in which services are commissioned, we turn now 
to consider some of the trends in the type of services that local authorities are commissioning.  
In the final sections of this chapter, we also look at the relationship between local authorities and 
non-commissioned providers.
4. Varying types of support: Changes in the  
type of services that are commissioned
4.1. Cutting back on floating support
We heard of wildly varying approaches to the 
commissioning of floating support by local 
authorities following the removal of the ring-fence 
and faced with reduced budgets. We heard from 
providers that some authorities had retained  
only their floating support contracts and  
de-commissioned the more expensive buildings-
based services. Others had taken the opposite 
approach on the basis that floating support is 
easier to de-commission than a project which 
occupies a specialist building (and also easier to 
re-commission further down the line). 
“All the services that, under Supporting People, 
were seen as the cheaper alternatives to 
supported housing, such as floating support, 
were quite often the first ones to go, because 
they’re easier, despite their cost effectiveness 
and the fact this has flown in the face of previous 
practice”. (Provider)
This approach was felt by participants of the 
Homeless Link focus group to have several key 
impacts on the system: 
— Firstly, withdrawing or reducing floating 
support increases the number of people 
becoming homeless whose homelessness 
could have been prevented; 
— Some of these people then end up in hostel 
settings which is cost ineffective for the 
system (since they do not necessarily need 
this level of support) and can be stressful 
and risky for them since it brings them into 
contact with others who have higher levels 
of need and may be involved in higher risk 
behaviours. 
— Finally, without the necessary support to 
enable someone to move from a hostel into 
an independent tenancy, people end up 
‘overstaying’ in hostels or being set up to 
fail in unsupported tenancies. Of course, this 
reminds us that access to affordable housing 
is in some areas also a huge barrier to timely 
resettlement. 
Imogen Blood & Associates / University of York (Centre for Housing Policy)  25
Focusing commissioned resources on crisis services 
for people with higher levels of need leaves gaps in 
both ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ services, which 
in turn reduces the effectiveness of the crisis 
services because: 
“we are now getting people who need more 
intensive support, and when they get to the end 
of the service journey, they do not have the 
capacity to move on successfully, and as a result 
come back through services”. (Provider)
Homelessness pathways need access to housing 
and support in the community if people with 
support needs are to be supported to exit 
homelessness sustainably; otherwise they end up 
‘circling’ around the system. 
4.2. Creating tiered models of  
floating support
Some providers who have retained, or re-instated 
floating support because they recognise its pivotal 
value have moved to a ‘tiered’ model in order to 
target resources more effectively: 
“When we re-commissioned our floating support, 
we created a two-tier service, with one ‘tier’ 
focusing on short-term, sharp, early intervention 
work. We were trying not to create longer-term 
dependence for clients where there was no need 
for this. Some people may only need to see a 
support worker a couple of times. So, these 
people can come to us and access support via a 
drop-in. This model is more flexible – rather than 
going through a process and completing an 
assessment form we just ask ‘What is it you 
need?’. It might be a furniture voucher or help 
with a Universal Credit claim. We still offer longer 
term floating support, as we recognise that some 
people will need this.”
Panel participants welcomed the flexibility of this 
service, as they felt it aimed to cut out unnecessary 
red tape in order to give people what they need. 
They felt that, for prevention to be effective, it 
was important to move away from the idea of a 
person having to reach a ‘threshold’ in order to 
become eligible for support. 
4.3. Creation of short-stay  
assessment centres
As part of its reconfigured pathway, the authority 
in the previous example told us it had developed 
“two homeless assessment centres. People with 
complex needs stay at the assessment centres for 
around six weeks, up to three months. During this 
time an assessment is carried out to build 
relationships and identify what support is 
needed”.  
Faced with increasing numbers of rough sleepers, 
several other authorities told us they had taken a 
similar approach, either re-purposing previous 
hostel accommodation to provide a short-stay 
‘assessment centre’ or acquiring a new building, 
sometimes using RSI funding. This model was felt 
to create a safe space and an opportunity to assess 
and work with individuals to better understand 
what support they needed and what their housing 
options are. The next step might include a move 
into supported housing, an independent tenancy or 
‘re-connection’ to another authority if they are 
found not to have a local connection. 
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4.4. More dispersed provision, using 
‘ordinary’, scattered housing 
Some commissioners reported a growing awareness 
of the unsuitability of much hostel provision for 
people with complex needs. Combined with 
political concerns about the impact of congregate 
models on local neighbourhoods, this was pushing 
a strategic direction of travel in some authorities to 
commission more dispersed units.
We found evidence of increased awareness and 
application of the ‘Housing First’ model in our 
interviews with commissioners. 
“Housing First is a system of support for 
homeless people with high and complex needs 
which is designed to deliver a sustainable exit 
from homelessness, improve health and well-
being and enable social integration. Housing First 
uses ordinary housing, such as private rented or 
social rented flats and is designed to house 
formerly homeless people with high needs in 
their own, settled homes as quickly as possible 
and to provide the support they will need to 
sustain an exit from homelessness in their own 
home”. (Blood et al 2017). 
Many of the commissioners we interviewed liked 
the model, but had seen both high- and low-fidelity 
versions of it. They recognised that, for Housing 
First to work well, it needs significant investment in 
support, access to a range of decent (not just 
hard-to-let) properties and the right local 
partnerships. Many felt/saw these as barriers to 
implementation in their authorities in the current 
context. Cost is also a driver here; if Housing First 
(or some version of it) can be supplied with ordinary 
housing, it is likely to cost a lot less than newbuild, 
specialist, congregate schemes. 
We discuss the risk of the model becoming ‘diluted’ 
in more detail in section 6.4. 
As a result of the trend towards dispersed provision 
and the growing popularity of the Housing First 
model, there was some evidence of hostel providers 
withdrawing from the market because they believe 
there is no future in hostel provision, or of 
commissioners making sudden decisions to 
decommission without a planned transition to 
housing-led alternatives. Providers felt it would be 
almost impossible to return to congregate models 
in future, due to planning constraints, resistance 
from local communities and the cost of land. 
Commissioners and panel members were keen to 
point out that living alone was not attractive to or 
suitable for everyone, and that there needed to be 
a choice of different models, including shared and 
group settings. A balanced view seemed to emerge, 
with the hope that high-fidelity Housing First could 
be offered as part of a wider strategy, alongside 
other options. 
Meanwhile, the principles of Housing First can 
and should be implemented more widely across 
the commissioning and provision of housing-
related support, and across the whole sector more 
widely. This aligns with the evidence base and with 
our other publications on the topic of ‘housing-led 
approaches’ (Blood et al., 2017) and Housing First 
as part of an integrated homelessness strategy 
(Pleace et al., 2016; Pleace, 2018). We return to this 
point in our recommendations in Section 7.3. 
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4.5. Exempt supported accommodation
Hearing previously about the local community 
sector re-creating a closed night shelter reminds us 
that anyone can set up a homelessness ‘service’ – 
as we saw the professional footballer Gary Neville 
do in Manchester in 2015/16. Any control of the 
sector only comes through local authority 
commissioning of support. Given the reduced 
budget in most authorities for commissioning 
support for those experiencing or at risk of 
homelessness, many are looking to non-
commissioned support to shore up the gaps  
in the system. This may include ‘exempt’ 
accommodation7, provided by a range of private, 
housing association and voluntary sector landlords, 
and wider support offered by the faith, community 
and business sectors. 
One commissioner told us the following story: 
“A huge reduction in the resources available to 
commission services for single homeless people 
has ground down commissioned services. 
Meanwhile, some of the poor providers that we 
got rid of before [through the Supporting People 
Quality Assessment Framework] are back and 
thriving, drawing their funding from Housing 
Benefit and providing much-needed bed spaces 
for desperate local authorities. The Department 
of Work and Pensions threatened to clamp down 
on Housing Benefit and change the funding 
model, and the uncertainty surrounding this 
prompted many good providers to leave the 
market but was never resolved. So effectively 
we’ve got a much bigger unregulated market 
than we’ve ever had before”.
This is another classic tale of unintended 
consequences, in which successive central 
government attempts to manage spending  
on supported housing have perversely led us  
to a place where we are spending an unknown 
amount of public money on services over  
which there is negligible regulation, strategic 
influence or even data. Some non-commissioned 
housing is the result of the private market 
responding to the opportunity to make money in 
response to the unmet need caused by funding 
cuts. We also heard examples in which local 
authorities had advised and worked with services to 
help them sustain their services using exempt 
Housing Benefit in the face of cuts to 
commissioned support. 
The panel members felt this was an important 
topic, which ‘legitimate’ providers of supported 
housing had previously been anxious not to draw 
political attention to lest it should prompt 
government to pull the plug on exempt Housing 
Benefit altogether. We heard how this part of the 
sector contains a huge variation of 
accommodation. A provider working with veterans 
attending the focus group explained that the vast 
majority of supported housing provision for 
veterans is now funded exclusively through exempt 
Housing Benefit, bolstered by charitable donation. 
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7 The category of supported housing, referred to as ‘exempt accommodation’, was created in 1996 to enable Housing Benefit to meet the 
additional costs of providing supported housing. For a Housing Benefit claim to be treated as an exempt accommodation claim, care, support 
or supervision (defined as ‘more than minimal’ has to be provided to the tenants by, or on behalf of, the landlord. Once a claim is accepted 
as an exempt accommodation claim, rent increases may be higher than for mainstream accommodation. As Welfare Reform measures were 
introduced from 2012, the government decided that help with housing costs of those living in exempt accommodation would be provided 
outside of their Universal Credit (UC) award through Housing Benefit and that Housing Benefit in respect of that accommodation would be 
excluded when applying the Benefit Cap. (See Blood et al, 2016) The Supported Accommodation Review, DWP/ DCLG)
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The following story, which was selected to go 
through to the national panel, tells of one local 
authority’s relationship with this diverse sector and 
how different departments are working together to 
pool the limited powers they have in order to try 
and improve quality within it. The findings of the 
Supported Accommodation Review (Blood et al., 
2016) conducted back in 2016 suggest that, 
although not unheard of, this type of proactive 
approach by a local authority is unusual and 
innovative. 
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Story: Improving quality in ‘non-commissioned supported housing’
“We have a flourishing non-commissioned sector. These are a mix of private and not-for-profit 
providers – who offer supported housing where the ‘support’ element is funded solely by exempt 
Housing Benefit as ‘Intensive Housing Management’. The council doesn’t fund any support on top of 
this. There is a real mix of quality in this part of the sector: some are really good providers – we would 
never be without them; but some are poor-quality and charge extortionate rates of Housing Benefit. 
We have set up a Supported Accommodation Review Team to help identify and tackle poor quality 
providers. As with our commissioned services, we will be knocking on the door of non-commissioned 
providers – the inspection team will include a Housing Benefit claims assessor, to check that the rate 
paid is fair. For example, they will check how many staff are supporting how many tenants and argue 
that there should be more staff if this doesn’t stack up. Also, a member of the private sector housing 
team will inspect the bricks and mortar quality, to ensure it is up to scratch. In some cases, property 
condition is poor with fire doors and smoke detectors missing. Adult Social Care officers (with 
supported accommodation contract management experience) will also attend, to look at support 
plans and ensure the support offered is the best that it can be. 
Through this, we will hold non-commissioned providers to account, so we can keep the good providers 
and remove or improve those providing a poor service.” 
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4.6. Support from the community
Commissioners’ views of and relationships with the 
wider ‘non-commissioned’ support sector was 
another theme that emerged from the interviews. 
This support, which might include soup runs, night 
shelters and day centres provided by faith and 
community groups, has often been in place for 
many years. However, there has been a huge 
increase in recent years as citizens have taken 
practical action in response to the growing 
numbers of people on the streets.
Some commissioners reported frustration, feeling 
that the actions of these groups sometimes worked 
against their strategy, for example, by ‘attracting’ 
homeless people into the area, or providing night 
shelter provision which risked disrupting the 
pathway. However, many commissioners felt that 
the local voluntary contribution had brought great 
value through providing a diversity of offer and 
filling the gaps left by the cuts. For example, one 
commissioner explained: 
“One positive to come out of the cuts to services 
is the recent development around peer support 
and volunteering to plug gaps across the main 
service – there is huge value in this. I hope this 
continues to develop, but I don’t believe it can 
replace wholesale other funded services”.
Another described their success in collaborating 
more strategically to develop a cross-sector, 
place-based response to homelessness: 
“We recently drafted a Rough Sleeping Strategy  
–  within that, we publicly recognise that the 
voluntary and faith-based sector have a set of 
skills and services which can help us connect with 
people who we are not ordinarily able to. We are 
also introducing ‘Street Support Network’ –  an 
information-sharing platform tool to improve 
partnership working across all of the sectors – 
including business, faith and communities. We 
can use this to divert some of that goodwill and 
resource that is out there towards services that 
are needed, avoiding unnecessary duplication: 
it’s our masterplan!”
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As we described in Section 2.2, the past couple of 
years have seen the introduction of a programme 
of national grants to local authorities as part of the 
Rough Sleeping Strategy Delivery Plan. Some of 
these have been allocated through a competitive 
tendering process; some allocated to areas with the 
highest official rough sleeper counts. There are two 
key aspects of this change: first the focus on rough 
sleepers; second the way in which the funding is 
provided. The latter fits with a wider trend of 
short-term, competitively accessed funding of local 
government by central government which was 
confirmed by our representative from the Local 
Government Association to be one of the findings 
of their forthcoming research.
The following commissioner story about the impact 
of this ‘bitty short-term funding’ to respond to the 
rising numbers of rough sleepers resonated strongly 
with panel members. It was felt by them to be one 
of the ‘most significant’ stories collected, partly 
because it resonated with their experiences of the 
impact of short-term funding throughout the 
system. 
Our analysis of commissioners’ responses when 
asked about the most significant changes in 
commissioning as a result of government policy 
over the past decade also confirms this as a 
significant change for many of them. Nearly all 
commented on the increased focusing of resources 
on people with complex needs and those sleeping 
rough. Around half highlighted the shift by central 
government towards funding short-term initiatives. 
5. ‘Bitty short-term funding’  
focusing on rough sleepers
Story: Bitty short-term funding
“When funding was provided through Supporting People, this felt more secure and we were able to plan 
and commission strategically. Since the removal of the ring-fence on this funding and since the increased 
focus on reducing rough sleeping, this has been replaced by shorter term, initiative-based funding from 
central government. Although the political focus on rough sleeping is welcome, this central government 
funding strategy has led to a ‘bitty’ approach to how we commission services. The government is now 
arguably drip-feeding some of the Supporting People funding back to us through rigid and time-limited 
funding streams. 
We have a local strategy: we know the services we need and the strategic gaps. We would like to be able 
to offer 8-10 year contracts, like our colleagues in adult social care, so that supported housing providers 
can plan with confidence, train their staff, invest in their buildings. We know that two year contracts lead 
to high staff turnover and uncertainty, which isn’t good for anyone.
Instead, I feel that all I ever do is chase money from little funds with short deadlines, trying to make our 
objectives fit theirs and then setting up short-term projects in ridiculously tight timescales; all in the full 
knowledge that none of this is really how we’d do it if we had longer-term, robust funding and the 
freedom to properly respond to local need”.  
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5.1. What is going on here?
As outlined in section 2 on the National Policy 
Context, there are several factors which have 
combined to create the backdrop for this change to 
the funding landscape for local authority 
homelessness services:
— The removal of the ring-fence from the 
Supporting People grant, which means that 
housing-related support for homeless people 
has to ‘compete’ locally for funding with 
other services which local authorities have 
a duty to provide, such as adult social care, 
temporary accommodation for homeless 
families, or bin services. 
— A backdrop of sustained cuts to local 
authorities’ general budgets, which have hit 
some authorities – generally those in more 
deprived, urban, and/or Northern settings 
(Harris et al., 2019) – harder than others; 
— Shifts in the nature and extent of 
homelessness, including widespread reports 
of an increased presence of high and complex 
needs among lone homeless adults and 
increases in people sleeping rough.
The combined impact of these factors will vary 
from authority, influenced by the extent to which 
local authorities have chosen to continue funding 
housing-related support from their general 
budgets. These choices are shaped by levels  
of funding, local needs and political stance.  
As a commissioner from another area explained: 
“When Supporting People was disbanded in 2013 
there were various responses – in this local 
authority we did a really good job of keeping it 
ring-fenced for specific services, in other areas it 
has been more absorbed. Our local authority is 
central, we attract a lot of homeless people... we 
have chosen to continue to commission services, 
as we see a need and have a passion for this type 
of service. We had good political backing here, 
fought our corner, saying that there is a need, 
politically we are lucky – it is on the agenda here”.
‘Bitty’ short-term funding for homelessness services 
is therefore both a product of local authority 
decisions about how to fund housing-related 
support in the face of sustained funding cuts, and 
new short-term central government funding for 
rough sleeper initiatives. 
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5.2. Why is this change significant?
Although almost all of our participants welcomed 
the increased political focus on rough sleeping, 
there was considerable criticism of the reactive, 
short-term response to managing the ‘symptoms’ 
of increased homelessness, when the resources to 
prevent and create a more strategic and 
sustainable response to homelessness were – in 
many areas – lacking. 
Competing for and implementing projects using 
short-term funding is time-consuming for local 
commissioners. This also emerged as a theme 
within the WIP Economics (2019) report (Thunder 
and Rose, 2019), which describes the ‘transaction 
costs’ of bidding. This is especially pronounced 
where the infrastructure for commissioning has 
been seriously reduced as a result of the cuts. 
The services or approach prescribed by the RSI  
may or may not fit a local authority’s existing 
homelessness and/or supported housing strategies, 
if indeed the reduced commissioning teams 
operating in some councils have had the capacity 
to plan strategically in this way. We heard that 
applying for such funding pots sometimes means 
local authorities have to, in the words of one 
commissioner, ‘dress old things up as if new’. 
Another argued: 
“Often, for government funding, they say, ‘be 
innovative’ – but what about non-innovative 
projects? Sometimes we don’t need to be 
innovative if we know it works somewhere else”. 
(Commissioner)
A number of commissioners reflected on the fact 
that they are now commissioning night shelters 
having previously de-commissioned them because 
– as one explained – “we now know that large scale 
dormitory style accommodation doesn’t work for 
people”. This is of course also being driven by the 
sheer scale of visible rough sleeping and the urgent 
need for a practical response to it, not just by the 
way in which government funding to do this is 
being organised. 
“We are kind of half-commissioning night shelters 
– we’ve seen a growth in night shelter delivery, 
which is crazy – we got out of commissioning 
night shelters because, while there might be a 
place for them, they aren’t what you’d want to 
commission – because we are scrambling to fill 
the gap. It’s madness”. (Commissioner)
We heard from providers that the tendering 
timeframes are often so tight and the funded 
period so short if successful that some local 
authorities are deciding to deliver in-house or 
contract out without conducting a full 
commissioning process. For example, one  
provider at a focus group explained:  
“We’ve been commissioned recently to deliver an 
assessment centre without going through any 
kind of a process but it’s a 12-month contract”. 
(Provider)
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Without time to meaningfully engage partners, 
providers or people with lived experience, the 
timescales for tendering for and setting up these 
initiatives risks destabilising local partnerships, 
markets and existing services. One commissioner 
was concerned that there had been little guidance 
or monitoring from central government following 
approval of the RSI grant. Greater accountability is 
needed, at both national and local levels if quality, 
safety and value for money is to be ensured. 
Particular concerns were expressed about the 
likelihood and impact of funding ‘sunsets’ at the 
end of these initiatives. We heard, for example, that 
a new supported lettings service had been set up, 
brokering private sector tenancies with floating 
support for rough sleepers; but that there would be 
no funding from April 2020, following nine months 
of service. Without the brokerage offer to landlords 
and the support offer to tenants, it seems hard to 
imagine many of these tenancies sustaining, 
leading to further re-traumatising circling around 
the system by these individuals. Another 
commissioner explained: 
“When we re-commissioned all the new services, 
this coincided with new money from RSI, so we 
expanded RS staffing – we doubled the team, 
added two navigator roles too – to reduce 
caseload and overall numbers. It has hugely 
supplemented what we have, but if it is taken 
away, we are back to less workers, back to relying 
on commissioned service to keep a lid on it”.
This illustrates how the uncertainty around short-
term initiative funding can make it difficult for 
commissioners to plan how best to deploy ongoing 
local authority funding. It also makes it difficult for 
providers to offer decent terms and conditions in 
order to recruit and retain skilled and experienced 
staff. 
From the perspectives of people using services 
(Social Care Institute for Excellence, 2018),  
the opportunity to build relationships with 
consistent workers is one of the key means by 
which services are effective. Pulling the plug  
on a project once this relationship has been 
established, risks further trauma for those with 
histories of loss and rejection, and the erosion 
of their trust in services in future. 
5.3. Moving forwards
Additional funding to help tackle homelessness is 
much needed. We heard how commissioners had 
been able to use the additional funding from the 
RSI to test new models, bolster existing provision, 
and get projects off the ground. However, set 
against a backdrop of cuts to local authority 
funding and without the time, flexibility and 
longer-term financial security to design, deliver and 
sustain a locally-tailored approach, they are unlikely 
to provide a sustained exit from homelessness and 
therefore do not make best use of public funds.
Participants argued that it is not possible to tackle 
rough sleeping sustainably without proper 
investment in a wider, planned menu of housing 
and support options, designed to support people to 
exit homelessness (and prevent future cohorts from 
rough sleeping). Levels of homelessness were 
reducing when, under Supporting People, services 
were well-funded. If the government is serious 
about ending rough sleeping, public services 
need to intervene earlier in people’s housing 
pathways and look at the root causes of their 
homelessness and support needs. This needs to 
happen alongside action to tackle the shortage of 
affordable housing. 
“You can’t solve this problem with lots of 
different bits of initiative”. (Commissioner)
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A number of findings and reflections emerge from 
this study regarding the question of ‘innovation’ – 
what does it mean to be truly ‘innovative’, how 
much value should be placed on ‘innovation’, what 
enables it and what gets in the way? For example, 
in the last section, we heard commissioners 
resenting the need to ‘dress old things up as new’ in 
order to compete for funding streams that prioritise 
‘innovation’. 
6.1. Innovation or ‘goldfish effect 
policy’?
In the section on ‘Doing more with less’, we 
presented a number of examples of what the 
research team termed ‘goldfish effect policy’. 
Goldfish are famed for their short-term memories 
(apparently five months, not the mythical three 
seconds). We use this term to highlight examples of 
apparent institutional amnesia, with models being 
de-commissioned only to be re-launched further 
down the line, despite the fact that in some cases, 
they had previously been found to be ineffective. 
Part of the problem here is that – as we have seen 
– expert commissioners and local long-standing 
providers have been lost, directly or indirectly as 
authorities have made cuts. However, our analysis 
of these examples also highlights that what 
appears to be organisational memory loss (and 
therefore has the goldfish effect) is often being 
driven by a number of complex factors behind the 
scenes.
Local authorities are not re-commissioning night 
shelters solely because their officers have forgotten 
that large-scale dormitory accommodation tends 
not have great outcomes for individuals; they are 
doing so because the sheer volume of 
humanitarian crisis on our streets necessitates  
an urgent, large-scale response, and this most  
basic of responses is all that can be afforded. 
As we saw in Chapter 5, the decision by some local 
authorities to de-commission all floating support 
for this client group has almost certainly both 
increased homelessness and reduced the 
effectiveness of other services. Our report explains 
the complex set of challenges facing local 
authorities which led to that decision in some 
authorities. Some of these local authorities have 
since decided they will need to reintroduce 
elements of floating support because the attempt 
to manage expenditure challenges by ending these 
services has been counter-productive. Added  
to these negative by-products are the human  
and financial costs of de-commissioning then 
re-commissioning services within a relatively  
short time.  
6. Enabling and sustaining innovation
Fig 4: ‘Goldfish’ policy making
A state of institutional amnesia in policy making, in which service models are de-commissioned only to be 
re-launched further down the line, despite the fact that they had previously been found to be ineffective.
Characteristics
— Institutional amnesia
— Services decommissioned  
only to be relaunched
— Models based on humanitarian crisis 
necessitating large scale response, 
not because they are effective
Preventative measures
— Retention of experienced officers  
and civil servants
— Involvement of people with lived 
experience who can see the whole 
system not just parts
— Use of available evidence on impact
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All this highlights the need for a better 
understanding of the relationship between  
central and local policy decisions and the impact 
these have on local service systems, the markets 
that deliver them and the individuals they support. 
Retaining experienced officers and civil servants, 
listening to the expertise of people with lived and 
professional expertise and using available evidence 
systematically should help to mitigate goldfish 
policy-making. Our findings suggest that this has 
not happened as much as it should over the past 
decade. Instead we have heard that there has  
been a high turnover of staff in central and  
local government combined with a top-down, 
managerial approach to both policy making and 
commissioning. This includes implementation of 
cuts by the centre without full consideration of the 
consequences, and some (but not all) local 
authorities then passing on cuts and making 
changes to commissioning without properly 
assessing impact locally, or engaging service 
providers and those using local services in  
planning their response. 
6.2. Innovation within constraints
Innovation is difficult in the current context.  
It can be hard to find the space to think when 
you are over-stretched, it is difficult to have 
conversations with providers when you are 
having to cut their services, and it can be hard  
to implement new ways of working when all 
available resources (and those of your potential 
partners) are tied up in the face of increased 
demand and fewer resources. 
“Until the end of austerity, we are just fire-
fighting in different forms”.  (Commissioner)
Despite this, our study found many examples of 
innovation and collaboration by local authorities, 
their partners, service providers and citizens in 
responding to homelessness within the challenging 
fiscal and policy context of the past decade. 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
Fig 5: Factors which enable and encourage innovation
— ‘Urgency on the ground’
— Realisation that whole 
system approach required
— Political will
— Flexible, longer-term funding
— Initiatives need to be part of integrated strategy to 
avoid ‘black holes’
— Financial and organisational commitment to 
sustainability essential
— Measure cost-effectiveness across agencies and over 
longer-term
— Investment in ‘softer’ elements of delivery as well as 
‘hard’ structures and systems
— Underpinned by core principles and regular shared 
reflection across delivery partners
Most significant innovations
What is driving innovation?
What encourages and sustains innovation?
— Willingness to listen and act on 
evidence
— Recognition that responses need 
to maximise individuals choice 
and control
— Emphasis on culture changes 
backed up by practical changes
Wrap-around services for  
Multiple Complex Needs
Positive psychological  
approaches
Housing First
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In this section, we showcase three of the examples 
which our panels felt to be the most promising, 
from the collection of commissioners’ stories.  
We reflect on the learning about what needs to  
be in place to enable these examples to get off the 
ground in the first place, and to be sustained. We 
also explore some of the risks, including those of 
promising models becoming diluted, or of ‘black 
holes’ being created, where improved services in 
one area or for one group draws in wider demand 
and risks implosion. 
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6.3. A wraparound service for people 
with complex needs
In this example, we look at the response of one 
unitary authority, working with their local health 
partners, to increasing demand from people with 
complex needs experiencing homelessness and 





“We witnessed a rapid growth in rough sleeping and complex cases – our main housing options and 
other health/welfare services struggled to cope. When people experience a crisis, they need services 
pulled around them. But services were turning away people who did not meet criteria – they were not 
commissioned, incentivised or prepared to deal with this level of complexity. 
“The combination of urgency on the ground and strategic will led to the design of a team whose 
remit was to work with people who have complex needs and are at risk of sleeping rough. The team 
adopts an integrated approach to public service delivery – at its core offering relationship-based 
support through Navigators and offering wraparound support, alongside the accommodation offer 
itself. It has a multi-agency staff, including those working in mental health, welfare benefits, 
probation and drug and alcohol services. The team make sure people gain access to the services they 
need and do not fall through the cracks. The key element is that we work with people for as long as 
needed. As is often the case with innovations of this type, the new team has placed additional 
demand on services, including through its  
advocacy role. 
“This new way of working has highlighted the need for commissioning to enable a more joined up 
approach and has facilitated a move toward coordinated, and ultimately joint strategic planning and 
investment. 
“One of the things I am most proud of is even though we had to respond to urgent challenges, we 
have designed a ‘whole system’ approach to attempt to break the cycle. We know that the approach 
has saved lives: I remember one very powerful letter I received from a parent who was certain they 
would have lost their loved one if it was not for the complex lives team”.
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The panel members confirmed the importance of 
rising numbers of people with complex needs, and 
the challenges this cohort face trying to access 
current services. 
An environment of reducing resources hits this 
cohort of people particularly hard since the way in 
which services are organised means they need to 
deal with different agencies if they are to access 
support for their multiple issues. Waiting lists, 
eligibility thresholds and caseloads have increased 
in response to tightened budgets. Gatekeeping 
kicks in – especially in relation to those with both 
mental health and substance use issues, which are 
often intertwined and therefore hard to diagnose 
and treat where they exist together. Many of this 
group have experienced trauma and loss and would 
benefit the most from consistent and positive 
relationships with a small number of workers. Yet 
instead they end up being passed around the 
system, experiencing barriers, exclusions and 
evictions which re-traumatise them and further 
erode their trust in services. 
As the work of the MEAM (Making Every Adult 
Matter) coalition (MEAM, 2019) has demonstrated, 
meeting multiple needs requires coordination and 
buy-in across health (including health, mental 
health and substance misuse services), housing, 
care and support, the criminal justice system and 
the DWP. Securing the commitment and funding to 
make this happen at scale across a city is a real 
achievement. The panel members particularly liked 
that fact that services wrap around the person, who 
is not required to go into and remain in 
accommodation in order to access support. 
Some panel members felt that, in an ideal world, 
this group would not need intensive case 
management to access mainstream services and 
that this should be the longer-term aim. There was, 
however, a recognition that we are still a long way 
from that ideal and that services like this are much 
needed. However, there were concerns about the 
sustainability of the initiative within the current 
funding climate. These focused on two specific 
challenges: 
Defining cost ‘effectiveness’
In the shorter-term, costs arising for the NHS from 
the wraparound service are likely to increase, as 
marginalised individuals are supported to access 
services they might not otherwise have received, 
creating ‘additional demand’. It is reasonable to 
hope that lifetime costs will fall, as emergency 
admissions are replaced with planned treatments, 
and the benefits of preventative healthcare kicks in. 
However, as we saw in the National Policy Context 
section, arguments for longer-term cost-
effectiveness can be challenging where the NHS is 
looking for ‘cashable savings’ and this group is 
relatively small. Yet, given the many cost 
inefficiencies we have highlighted in this report, it 
would be deeply ironic if a project like this should be 
discontinued on the grounds that it is not cost-
effective. 
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Prevention as well as a crisis response
In setting up the new service, eligibility criteria have 
to be created in order to manage demand and 
target the offer on those who need it most. But 
what happens to those who do not reach the 
threshold for the complex needs service? In a 
context of limited resources across the whole 
system, there is a risk of the specialist service 
drawing in limited resources (like the ‘black hole’), 
making it even harder for those who are not (yet) at 
this stage to get help. The service becomes a 
limited and expensive exercise if it is only in 
effect waiting for people to collapse to the 
point where they qualify for assistance.  
To counter this risk, it needs to be part of an 
integrated strategy where there is also access to 
lower and medium intensity support. Hopefully 
there is the potential to achieve this integrated 
strategy through the partners’ commitment to 
‘joint strategic planning’ moving forwards. Though 
these other parts of the strategy will, of course, 
require ongoing financial investment too and that 
will be challenging in the current funding climate. 
We heard examples from other local authorities of 
smaller steps which had been taken towards 
working across agency ‘silos’. One commissioner 
explained that they had developed a framework 
contract so that other local public services could 
contract the same providers without duplicating 
procurement processes. Another told us they were 
developing a ‘hub’ model within hostels, making 
changes to the building so that health and other 
providers could come in to offer clinics. Although 
positive, some of these smaller steps again start to 
smack of the goldfish effect: for example, hub 
models involving multi-agency partners were 
running in the 1990s. 
6.4. Housing First – the importance  
of getting it right
As we saw in Chapter 5, there is increasing interest 
in the Housing First model as a solution for the 
increasing numbers of people with high and 
complex needs. However, the following story 
highlights the importance of careful groundwork, 
proper investment and strong partnership working 
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Story: 
“Whilst homelessness providers work hard to accommodate people with complex and high-level needs, the 
environment they are operating in means it is difficult to offer appropriate help. Housing First is a person-
centred, evidence-based approach to supporting homeless people with complex needs, including a history 
of rough sleeping, to live in their own home.  Following the publication of a study completed by Crisis, one 
combined regional authority has been awarded £7.7 million to run a three-year pilot.
“Housing First will be delivered in this area through a phased approach, with commissioning being broken 
down into smaller lots rather than one prime provider. The first phase of delivery will be delivered by staff 
directly employed by the authority, with full commissioning beginning later in the year. Direct employment 
of staff will ensure the model is flexible and reactive to feedback, and full-scale commissioning will ensure 
Housing First is sustainable and embedded.
“We are developing a commissioning framework with partners across a range of housing and support-
related services, including a lived experience officer.  We are committed to ensuring Housing First leads to 
system change, with the individual deciding where they want to live and choosing the support they need. 
We have to allow people to develop and grow, and not fix what we think is wrong. We want to ensure that 
when the funding ends, the open-ended support someone might need stays in place. We plan to 
encourage and facilitate shared learning within commissioning across the combined authority, for the 
benefit of people with multiple and complex needs. 
“By contrast to this carefully-planned and well-resourced approach, other local authorities interviewed told 
us they are seeing more providers who say they are running a Housing First model, but that sometimes this 
is a very ‘watered-down version’, offering very low level support (sometimes funded only by exempt 
Housing Benefit) in dispersed accommodation with a lack of strategic focus”. 
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Housing First has a strong international evidence 
base (Padgett et al., 2016; Goering et al., 2014) with 
very promising outcomes, which has been and 
continues to be adapted to the UK context. Its 
greatest potential lies in its principles (Homeless 
Link, 2016), which include choice-based, holistic and 
non-coerced support and seeing housing as a right, 
not an entitlement. 
However, the panel members expressed concern 
that the Housing First model is not being fairly 
tested in the UK due to a loss of fidelity in 
implementation in some settings. Within the 
current funding landscape, providers and 
commissioners are often trying to introduce the 
model without proper investment in support and/or 
with insufficient stability of funding to be able to 
confidently describe the offer as open-ended. The 
rush to set up projects and deliver outcomes quickly 
within time-limited funding streams creates a risk 
that projects do not spend long enough in the 
planning phase. Meanwhile, as the story illustrates, 
dispersed supported housing projects, some 
running without any commissioned support, are 
attracting the label ‘Housing First’. When problems 
occur due to lack of support, the whole model risks 
being discredited.
The story highlights the importance of 
implementing the model at the right pace with the 
right resources in place, through dialogue with both 
providers and people with lived experience. It shows 
how Housing First can be developed as part of a 
wider strategy, through a commissioning approach 
which promotes fidelity, sustainability and wider 
system change. 
Imogen Blood & Associates / University of York (Centre for Housing Policy)  41
6.5.   Humanising the approach 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
Story: 
“Over the last few years, we have gained a better understanding of what works for people affected by 
homelessness. We now know that large-scale, dormitory-style accommodation doesn’t work for people. 
And the language around homelessness  – ultimately working on what we now recognise as a deficit 
model  –  the more problems you tell us you have, the more we will help you. That is completely pointless, 
it doesn’t lead to positive change in someone’s life, it completely dehumanises. 
“Going forward we are looking at re-humanising the approach. We do not need to tell someone that 
they are addicted to alcohol, that they must work on the alcohol before we will progress them to the 
next level. We need to ask what interests them, what they can and cannot do, and help coach people 
towards these settings. This ultimately helps people take responsibility for themselves.
“We are doing a number of things to implement these changes: 
— We weigh quality over price when we are evaluating providers’ tenders: we are clear that we 
expect support staff to be paid well, trained and properly supervised.
— We are more flexible in our contracts – we don’t prescribe the number of hours of support which 
have to be provided. We trust and talk to our providers more, recognising that to achieve good 
outcomes for individuals, it is unreasonable to attach them to a contract. 
— We provide outreach teams, where the workers have smaller caseloads and can build strengths-
based relationships over time with people. 
— We tell everyone living in supported housing that they can access non-judgemental, personalised 
coaches if they want to”. 
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Despite the increased traction of trauma- and 
psychologically-informed approaches across the 
sector, the panels heard examples of distressed 
people being treated with an apparent lack of 
empathy within the homelessness system.  
We would argue that this is a symptom of the 
‘traumatised system’ and is perhaps unsurprising 
given what one participant described as: 
“endless rhetoric around ‘incentivising’ in 
Westminster, and huge othering of those 
affected by homelessness, poverty, asylum,  
etc, etc”. 
The ‘deficit-based’ model, which was introduced 
within adult social care services by the 1990 NHS 
and Community Act, has been the dominant 
method for rationing care and support over the 
past few decades. It requires people to describe 
their problems in order to demonstrate they have 
high enough needs to be eligible for services. 
Professional experts ‘assess’ problems in order to 
define a plan to ‘fix’ them (Blood and Guthrie, 
2018). Although sitting outside of statutory adult 
social care, housing-related support for homeless 
people has nevertheless been influenced by this 
dominant culture. 
‘Support plans’ became a requirement of the 
Supporting People Programme and, although some 
take a ‘strengths-based’ approach, ascertaining 
what matters most to the individual and how 
support can best help them get there, we get the 
impression from our training and consultancy that 
many are still agency-led plans to ‘fix’ people. 
Hansen Löfstrand and Juhila (2012) have argued 
that the ‘blame the victim’ mentality from 
workhouse and indeed pre-workhouse days never 
really went away from the sector and that an 
undercurrent of needing to fix ‘deviance’ underpins 
even the more progressive models.
Given this legacy, the panel was sceptical about 
some of the ‘buzz words’ and ‘flavour of the 
month’ language like ‘asset-based coaching’ and 
‘strengths-based approaches’. Some identified 
goldfish effect policy and argued that the housing-
related support sector had been working (or at  
least trying to work) in this way for years; others  
felt it was easy to write these words in a 
specification or a bid, but that did not mean 
they were translated into practice. Support 
workers trying to engage people through their 
interests is not new, though it does require proper 
funding and there is a tension between short-term 
pressure for ‘value for money’ and these more 
relationship-based approaches. In the case of 
Housing First, we would argue that the two are 
actually irreconcilable and that there are huge 
threats to the success of the model in the UK  
as a result. 
Nevertheless, the panels found some hope in  
this commissioner’s story. They welcomed the 
recognition that practical changes have to be  
made to the way services are funded, 
commissioned, contracted and performance 
managed if this vision is to be realised.  
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6.6. Enabling and sustaining innovation
What has enabled innovation in these stories?
— A sense that something had to change in the 
face of ‘urgency on the ground’. 
— A realisation that a whole system approach 
was needed: this is not a problem that can be 
tackled by one agency alone. 
— Strategic leadership and political will to 
re-design the approach. 
— Proper investment, but through a funding 
stream which allows enough time and 
flexibility to develop the partnerships 
necessary to plan a locally-responsive 
approach. 
— A willingness to listen to and act on evidence
–  from research, practice and lived 
experience 
–  to understand the key components  
of a successful approach.
— A recognition that the service offer needs to 
be relational and holistic if it is to be effective: 
it needs to maximise individuals’ choice and 
control. 
— An understanding that you cannot simply 
write this requirement into commissioning 
contracts and expect it to happen: culture 
change requires practical changes to tender 
processes, contract length and value, and 
performance management.  
 
 
What can we learn from the stories about what 
is needed to sustain innovation?
— Initiatives need to be part of an integrated 
strategy if the ‘black holes’ are to be 
successfully managed; this needs to plan 
the service response to those who do not 
meet the criteria as well as those who do, 
containing a menu of service options or 
pathways for different levels of support  
need within that strategy. 
— A financial and organisational/partnership 
commitment to sustainability – to provide 
ongoing support for individuals, whilst 
working towards change of mainstream 
services
— A multi-agency, long-term view of what cost-
effectiveness means.  
— A recognition that successful implementation 
requires a balanced focus on both those 
elements which might be described as the 
‘softer’ elements of organisations and 
partnerships – shared values, skills, style  
and staff – as well as on those ‘harder’ 
elements – strategy, structure and systems 
(Waterman et al., 1980). For example, the 
third commissioner recognising that staff 
need to be paid well, trained and properly 
supervised if they are to deliver the emotional 
labour which comes with a more ‘human’ 
approach, and the Housing First project 
recognising the need to ‘facilitate shared 
learning’ across the system. 
— Clear articulation of the core principles of 
an integrated strategy and regular shared 
reflection on what they mean in practice – if 
the risk of fidelity dilution is to be minimised. 
In the next and final chapter, we develop these 
points further, drawing messages for future policy 
and strategy from this body of evidence. 
 
‘A TRAUMATISED SYSTEM’
Fig 6: The ‘traumatised system’
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7.1. The ‘traumatised system’
The examples and experiences we have gathered 
and presented in this report start to build a picture 
of a homelessness system which might be 
described as ‘traumatised’, or shocked and upset by 
the direct and indirect effects of funding cuts and 
changes to national policy.  
Just like the individuals it aims to support, there is 
evidence of enormous resilience here too. 
Throughout this report, we have highlighted 
examples of organisations, services, professionals 
and people with lived experience adapting to a 
rapidly shifting level of resources, the challenges of 
rising homelessness and higher levels of needs 
among homeless people, alongside radical changes 
to policy and practice. Much has been achieved 
working with an ever falling level of resource and 
there are stories here of striking innovation, new 
levels of collaboration and the development of both 
more effective and more humanitarian practice in 
reducing homelessness. 
However, this is only one side of a complex story, 
some of these adaptations and changes that have 
occurred in commissioning, planning and delivery 
of homelessness services must now be recognised 
as maladaptive, inefficient and counter-productive. 
Our work has found many examples of ‘trauma’ at 
all levels of the system: 
— Beleaguered commissioning teams pressing 
the repeat button on existing contracts 
because – although they know something 
different is needed to effectively reduce 
homelessness – they have insufficient and 
unpredictable funding to implement strategic 
changes. 
— Providers – sometimes with the active blessing 
of local authorities – reconfiguring their 
no-longer commissioned services so they can 
survive on significantly lower funding from 
‘exempt accommodation’ Housing Benefit, 
usually offering much lower levels of support. 
— Providers taking a more risk-averse approach 
to who they will work with and the activities 
they offer, so they can deliver over-promised 
outputs on contracts whose value has been 
slashed. 
— People with high levels of needs experiencing 
inadequate levels of support and inconsistent 
relationships with staff, whilst living in 
supported housing.
— Examples of statutory homelessness workers 
responding to people presenting in distress 
with an apparent lack of empathy, seeming 
to prioritise legal process and ‘gatekeeping’ 
over a ‘more human’ response, presumably as 
a result of managing high levels of demand 
with insufficient resources.  
7. What is needed to ‘de-traumatise’ the system?
Cross-departmental 
thinking and planning
Staff trained in trauma 
and its effects
Fig 7: A ‘de-traumatised’ system
Conditions which encourage  
innovation and collaboration
High level  
quality  
framework
Integrated strategies  




Whole system  
commissioning
Imogen Blood & Associates / University of York (Centre for Housing Policy)  45
Our study has also found much that could be 
described as adaptive, innovative and collaborative 
within the sector, such as: 
— Commissioners initiating dialogue with 
people delivering and receiving services to 
understand what matters and how this can 
best be achieved locally. 
— Health and council services working together 
to jointly commission and deliver services 
differently for people with multiple needs. 
— Better strategic coordination of support from 
the faith, community and business sectors 
alongside that provided by statutory and 
commissioned services. 
— Providers and councils training their staff to 
recognise people’s behaviour as a function of 
past trauma. 
— A recognition from central and government 
that cross-departmental thinking and action 
is needed if a complex, ‘wicked’ problem like 
rough sleeping is to be ended. 
These findings, while identifying many significant 
challenges and concerns, should also give real hope 
that positive change is possible. Despite a concern 
expressed by some about ‘lack of evidence’ in the 
sector, we heard huge insight and wisdom drawn 
from practice and lived experience during this 
study. We know what works and what is needed to 
end homelessness (e.g. Crisis, 2018). If the system 
can be ‘de-traumatised’ so that imagination and 
innovation are enabled and sustained, it should be 
possible for things to get a lot better a lot quicker. 
In order to create a fully-functioning system to 
prevent and end homelessness, our findings 
suggest that an integrated strategy for housing 
and support, under-pinned by stable funding and a 
high-level quality framework, is needed at both 
national and local levels. In the remainder of the 
report, we describe the key features of such a 
system. 
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7.2. Stable funding for housing-related 
support
Strategic planning requires time and infrastructure; 
innovation is only possible when people are not 
constantly re-tendering and firefighting. We 
increasingly recognise that traumatised individuals 
need safety and predictability if they are to let go 
of previously self-protecting but now maladaptive 
behaviours. Similarly, those commissioning, 
providing and receiving local homelessness services 
need sufficient reassurance that there will be 
continuity of resource if the adaptive behaviours we 
have identified are to be nurtured and sustained. 
Our report has demonstrated that – ironically – the 
fixation on value for money has sometimes led to 
scenarios in which value for money is ultimately 
undermined. 
Our findings suggest that: 
— Sustained cuts to local authority and health 
funding have impacted on the amount and 
quality of housing-related support/supported 
housing available to those experiencing or at 
risk of homelessness. 
— Uncertainty about future budget allocations 
from central government make it hard for 
local authorities to plan. This results in short-
term contracts which reduce value for money 
as providers also cannot plan with confidence, 
i.e. attract and retain good staff and invest in 
services. 
— Short-term, prescriptive and competitively-
accessed funding for rough sleeper initiatives 
ties up commissioner time and does not 
always align with wider local strategies. Short-
term funding involves setting up, operating 
and then de-commissioning projects, i.e. 
project ‘sunsets’ continually occur because 
funding is short-term. This is a resource-
intensive process and can be damaging to 
relationships and outcomes for individuals. 
— There is evidence of attempts at efficiency 
leading to inefficiencies, for example with 
services being set up and ended, only to be 
resurrected because they were necessary 
to begin with (in what we labelled ‘goldfish 
effect policy’). In other cases, cuts to one area 
of services have caused rises in spending and/
or logistical challenges in others. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
— Proper investment in support, alongside 
access to affordable housing, is needed in 
order to prevent and end homelessness. 
— Funding levels need to be predictable and 
facilitated by longer-term contracts in order 
to help local authorities and service providers 
plan.
— Funding streams need to be provided with 
local control and flexibility, balanced with 
accountability. 
— More comprehensive/strategic impact 
assessment of proposed policies is needed 
both nationally and locally to ensure a longer-
term view of ‘value for money’. This needs 
to involve people with lived and frontline 
experience of services as well as senior 
managers and policy leads. 
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7.3. A quality framework for the 
supported housing sector
There were calls from some participants in the 
study for national quality standards for supported 
housing; however, this is challenging given the huge 
variation in models and the levels of funding 
received. 
Our findings suggest that: 
— Most commissioning still tends to be 
managerially driven, focusing on throughput, 
processes and value for money rather than 
on relationships and outcomes for individuals 
and communities. 
— While local authorities have made some 
progress in this area; the consistent provision 
of relationship-based, trauma-informed 
and person-centred approaches has to be 
supported by practical changes to tender 
processes, contract length and value, and 
performance management. It is not sufficient 
for strategies and specifications to simply 
state that this should be the ethos.
— The lack of consistent regulation across the 
sector makes it difficult for local authorities 
and quality providers to plan strategically and 
can leave people using services vulnerable to 
poor quality provision.
RECOMMENDATIONS
— There needs to be greater understanding and 
scrutiny of what non-commissioned services 
are doing. 
— A framework which draws on the Housing 
First principles could provide the shared 
understanding of ‘quality’ which is currently 
lacking.  
 The Housing First Principles are:
1. People have a right to a home 
2. Flexible support is provided for as long  
as it is needed 
3. Housing and support are separated 
4. Individuals have choice and control 
5. An active engagement approach is used 
6. The service is based on people’s strengths, 
goals and aspirations 
7. A harm reduction approach is used 
(Homeless Link, 2016) 
 
This does not mean that ‘Housing First’ should 
itself necessarily be the dominant model, or that 
housing and support can never be offered as part 
of a package together (i.e. within a fixed site 
supported housing service). However, it does mean 
that people’s housing and support needs should be 
assessed and a package which is appropriate to 
both put in place as soon as is practicable. This 
should, for example, reduce the numbers of people 
being placed in supported housing which offers too 
much or insufficient support simply because it is 
the only way to meet their housing need. Viewing 
housing as a right does not mean that it will be 
possible to give everyone a home in the current 
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context; however, it does mean that we continue to 
challenge the belief that housing is a reward at the 
end of the pathway for those who have 
demonstrated their ‘readiness’. 
Perhaps most importantly, using the principles  
as a guide for all homelessness services has the 
potential to embed choice and control and 
strengths-based approaches as a core quality 
standard across the sector. This recognises that  
it is the relationships between people working in 
services and those they support which have the 
most potential to end and prevent homelessness. 
Commissioning needs to start with an 
understanding of what is needed to support  
these relationships, and design and manage 
contracts in a way that supports these to happen. 
The whole pathway – from Housing Options 
through supported housing – needs to take a  
‘more human’ as well as a more integrated 
approach. This means having honest adult 
conversations with people experiencing 
homelessness about their rights, options, 
responsibilities and consequences. There is much 
good practice in this respect already, evidenced by 
this work and other research in this field, but there 
will be cases where this will require a significant 
shift in culture, language, values and management. 
7.4. A local integrated homelessness 
strategy
A local, integrated strategy should bring together 
strategies for homelessness prevention and rough 
sleeping, the commissioning of housing-related 
support, affordable housing supply and private 
rented sector access and enforcement.  There 
needs to be coordination between these different 
elements if local homelessness prevention, relief 
and reduction are to be as effective as possible. For 
example, there should be clear pathways between 
statutory homelessness systems and supported 
housing provision.
The Homelessness Reduction Act encourages this 
since it requires councils to provide more proactive 
support to all single households that present as 
homeless or are threatened with homelessness. 
Allocations policies should not prevent people who 
have histories of failed tenancies or offending from 
getting a social tenancy, where the person will be 
receiving the support they need to sustain that 
tenancy. 
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Our findings suggest that: 
— There is an emerging recognition in some 
authorities that providers and people with 
lived experience of services need to be part 
of developing effective local solutions as they 
often have experience of the whole system. 
The value of these different insights and the 
importance of good ‘market-shaping’ has 
been evident through this study.
— Competitive tendering focused largely on 
lowest price does not seem to be the best 
mechanism for promoting quality or cost-
effectiveness in this sector. There is evidence 
this can lead to cuts in staff pay and terms 
and conditions, and reductions to the scope 
and coverage of services in order to compete.  
Interestingly, many commissioners are 
encouraging alliances and dialogue as a way 
of better managing the provider ‘market’. 
— In the current funding environment, focusing 
resources on crisis services for people with 
higher levels of need leaves gaps in both 
‘upstream’ prevention and ‘downstream’ 
resettlement services. This makes it more 
likely for people to become homeless and 
harder for them to exit homelessness. 
Medium-level support services often do not 
work well for those with high and complex 
needs, who then either avoid services, 
abandon, get evicted or over-stay.
RECOMMENDATIONS 
— Strategies should be developed through 
engagement with supported housing 
providers, people with lived experience and 
the wider voluntary and community sector. 
— A wider range of evaluation criteria should be 
used to assess tenders, particularly including 
user-led views of what makes for an effective 
service.  
— Local authorities need to be clear about the 
role of different housing support projects 
and models within the system and how 
they function together as a whole system. 
Quantitative and qualitative evidence about 
what works best for whom should be used to 
inform decisions about criteria, ideal length 
of stay/support provision and expected 
outcomes. There must be sufficient flexibility 
in practice to provide a person-centred 
response. 
— Local strategies should also consider how best 
use should be made of the built assets within 
the supported housing system now and in the 
future, alongside finding the right balance 
between fixed site and floating support 
services, and the implications of this for local 
commissioning strategies. 
— There needs to be investment in lower 
intensity floating support services that can 
both prevent homelessness and support and 
sustain resettlement which must be a vital 
part of any effective system, along with 
models that work effectively with people with 
complex needs. 
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7.5. A whole system approach 
Effective responses to homelessness require 
coordination of wider services, so that the support, 
treatment, housing, benefits and access to 
education or work that a person needs are all in 
place. 
Our findings suggest that: 
— Commissioning tends to happen in agency/
policy ‘silos’, yet homelessness is a complex 
problem which can only be tackled effectively 
through whole system strategic planning. 
For example, it is not possible to sustainably 
tackle rough sleeping without aligned 
strategies to provide affordable housing and 
mental health services.
RECOMMENDATIONS
— Strategic buy-in from health and criminal 
justice agencies and the DWP is essential and 
the integrated homelessness strategy needs 
to be aligned with local NHS Sustainability 
and Transformation Plans, adult social care 
and mental health commissioning strategies 
and other relevant strategies (e.g. domestic 
violence, community safety, etc). 
— This strategic join-up should translate at 
an operational level so, for example, there 
are triage points and referral routes for 
people with complex needs from hospitals, 
Independent Domestic Violence Advisers or 
prison resettlement services into Housing First 
provision. 
— The strategy should pave the way for joint 
commissioning, e.g. of homeless healthcare 
or services to support people with complex 
needs and/or actions which agencies will 
take to make their mainstream services more 
accessible to these groups. 
— There needs to be a wider and longer-term 
understanding of what ‘cost-effectiveness’ 
means. The current narrow view in 
which separate agency budgets must be 
defended unless ‘cashable savings’ can be 
demonstrated risks leading us into cost-
shunting and inefficiency across the totality 
of public sector spending. We need structures 
and cultures which promote greater shared 
accountability for longer-term costs across the 
public sector. 
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7.6. Creating the right conditions for 
innovation
Innovation is difficult in the current context,  
with commissioners and providers often tied up 
‘fire-fighting’ in the face of increased demand  
and fewer resources. 
Our findings suggest that: 
— Innovation happens where there is a strategic 
approach to making systems deliver what 
individuals need. 
— In some areas, promising models are 
emerging which offer wraparound services 
that are person-led and maximise choice 
and control for people. But, where the wider 
system is overstretched, there are concerns 
about these models becoming diluted or 
rationed, and about the impact of drawing 
resources from one part of the system to 
another (in what we labelled a ‘black hole’).
RECOMMENDATIONS
— The sector needs to identify, understand and 
nurture promising practice. 
— Policies, commissioning strategies, 
performance frameworks and funding 
streams should be designed so as to support 
the conditions to prompt and sustain 
innovation. If we only ever develop these 
with the aim of reducing loopholes for 




 We hope that this project has started the 
process of identifying  PROMISING PRACTICE, 
and begun the national conversation about 
what is needed to expand and sustain it. 
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Story collection
Interviewees were asked, ‘In your opinion, what good and bad changes have occurred over the last ten years 
in commissioning homeless services, as a result of changing government policy?’ 
Having collected as many good and bad changes as possible, the interviewer then read back the list, asking: 
‘From your point of view, which of the changes mentioned has been the MOST significant for you?’ 
Once a change has been selected, the interviewer asked: 
— ‘Please describe what the commissioning environment was like before this change’
— ‘Please describe what happened that caused the change (be as specific as possible)’
— ‘Please describe what the commissioning environment is like now, i.e. what is the impact of this change?
Interviews were audio-recorded and partially transcribed by the interviewer who summarised the answers to 
the last three questions into a ‘story’ of around half a page, with each answer forming a short paragraph – 
effectively the beginning, middle and end of the story. Interviewees were subsequently given the opportunity 
to amend their draft stories by email and were asked for their consent to use these stories anonymously in  
the remainder of the study. One did not respond within the timescales, and we produced two stories each  
from two authorities, since we felt this allowed a full gamut of issues to be included in the final collection.  
All 19 titles are listed below. 
Titles of stories collected
Stories in green were selected to go through to the national panel
Panel 1
— Local authorities embrace cross-sector 
partnerships
— Transforming rough sleeper and  
homeless services
— Growth of an unregulated market
— Creating pathways into homelessness 
prevention services, with a single point of 
access through the council
— Loss of services in a 2-tier authority 
— Bitty short-term funding 
— Cross-area commissioning
— Safety and signposting: reducing the  
‘non-essentials’
— Short, flexible, early support  




— An asset-based approach 
— Loss of resettlement and preventative services
— The Homelessness Reduction Act 
— Improving quality in non-commissioned 
supported housing 
— Loss of evidence and government expertise
— Humanising the approach
— Co-production in model re-design
— Super-provider monopoly 
— A wraparound service for people with  
complex needs
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Story selection panels
We worked with Riverside to identify and invite both internal and external participants to two first round 
panels held in Manchester during August 2019. These included people from a range of roles – strategic, 
operational, communications, frontline and GROW trainees, who have lived experience. We were joined by 
representatives from the National Housing Federation and from Shelter. Each panel had six members, and 
considered ten and nine stories respectively, working to agree what they thought was most significant from 
each story and from the collection as whole, and why. Each selected three stories to be considered by the 
national panel. 
The panels were facilitated by Imogen Blood and observed by Nicholas Pleace and members of the Riverside 
in-house research team. 
National Panel members
Kate Farrell Strategic Lead on Homelessness Liverpool City Region Combined Authority
Chris Hancock Head of Best Practice Crisis
Helen Mathie Head of Policy and Communications Homeless Link
Darrell Smith Head of Supported Housing Ministry of Housing, Communities  
  & Local Government
Richi Prosser Peer researcher Lived experience
Priya Thethi Lead on Homelessness Local Government Association
Drew Van Doorn Chief Executive HACT (Housing Associations Charitable Trust)
Supplementary discussion at GMCA
Andy Burnham Mayor of Manchester GMCA
Jane Forrest Assistant Director Public Service Reform GMCA
Molly Bishop Strategic Lead for Homelessness GMCA
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